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Abstract
With rapid urbanization, environmental problems like green space shortage and urban
flooding become prevalent. Identifying effective policymaking and implementation is
critical in order to solve these problems. This dissertation addresses four theoretical topics
in the context of urban green infrastructure: policy entrepreneur, institutional response to
club goods, quasi-public-private partnership, and policy goal ambiguity. Each is
exemplified by a causal case study. Data were collected through participant observation,
field trips, semi-structured interviews, and crowdsourcing.
Chapter 1 takes a longitudinal perspective and examines the dual role of policy
entrepreneur and policy implementer in reaching the final policy goal of mandating vertical
greening in the law in Shanghai (1992-2016). Usually, policy implementer and policy
entrepreneur are two distinct identities and studied separately. This paper provides an
unusual counterexample, exploring how the two intertwined identities may influence the
entrepreneurial strategies and further influence the incremental policymaking process.
Chapter 2 illustrates how government involvement may facilitate club-good development
by investigating the nascent for-profit shopping mall roof garden (SMRG) development.
SMRGs, established by developers to provide an amenity to mall customers, are in nature
club goods. Although the government appreciates SMRGs given their positive externalities
(e.g., recreation, stormwater mitigation), existing public policies fail to respond to SMRGs’
cross-sector nature, leaving significant financial, legitimacy, and oversight gaps
unattended. The research suggests that government involvement can better facilitate clubgoods’ sustainable development by creating an enabling institutional environment, which
includes optimized policy design and coordinated cross-department collaboration.
Chapter 3 focuses on the rarely studied phenomenon of the Quasi-Public Private
Partnership (QPPP) in non-liberal societies. This work offers a general definition of QuasiPPPs and identifies factors that influence the PPP to QPPP transition. In the case of ecoenvironmental service provision, the PPP-QPPP transition occurred in two stages. First,
the eco-environmental service partnerships, initially established as PPPs, became
xii

inoperable with inexperienced partners and unsupportive markets. Second, with financial
bailouts from the government, the private partner became a subordinated partner in a
consortium between private partners and State-Owned Enterprises, and PPPs transitioned
to QPPPs. In a non-liberal society, when the three critical PPP assumptions are violated
(competent partners, supportive market, and horizontal partner structure), PPPs are more
likely to transition to QPPPs.
Chapter 4 examines how policy goal ambiguity influences policy implementation
outcomes, exemplified by the Sponge City Program (SCP) implementation. SCP is a
centrally-initiated program, requiring mainly the use of green instead of gray infrastructure
to manage urban stormwater. When implemented top-down, three cross-level, layered
goals of sustainability, stormwater management, and resident satisfaction became
incoherent and vague in terms of priority and measurement. The research demonstrates that
in a program with multiple policy goals, the goal priority ambiguity allows implementers
the discretion to decide the order of goals to manage interest conflicts. Moreover, the goal
measurement ambiguity allows implementers to decide the degree of their commitment to
each goal, and to interpret the desired performance of a goal. Such ambiguity-caused
discretions drastically inhibit the achievement of the sustainability policy goal.
Keywords: policy development, green infrastructure, policy entrepreneur, club goods,
quasi-public-private partnership, policy goal ambiguity
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Research background
By 2050, about 70% of the world population will live in cities, which points to the
importance of sustainable city development (Dixon, Eames, Hunt, & Lannon, 2014). Urban
green infrastructure (GI), an interconnected network of open green space including parks,
green corridors, urban woodlands, community gardens, and roof greening, are regarded as
a valuable natural resource contributing to sustainable cities (Benedict & McMahon, 2002;
Hunter & Luck, 2015; Tzoulas et al., 2007). GI plays a critical role in addressing many
urban environmental problems such as improving air quality, mitigating the greenhouse
effect, managing urban stormwater, and providing recreational spaces for residents. In this
dissertation, the term GI refers to all urban green spaces as differentiated from the gray
infrastructure (sewer and stormwater lines, treatment plants, and roads). In China, rapid
urbanization over recent decades has increased the agglomeration and compactness of
urban land use (Mu, Mayer, He, & Tian, 2016), creating a shortage of green space shortage
and increased urban flooding. For instance, despite continuous efforts of the local greening
administration, the public green space per capita in Shanghai remains extremely low; only
4.6 m2 in 2000 (Hu, 2001). In addition, with the dual effects of climate change and the
increasing percentage of impervious surfaces, urban flooding has become more frequent
and more extreme (Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, & Corfee-Morlot, 2013). For example, in
2012, Beijing was hit with one of the heaviest rainstorms in the past 60 years, resulting in
79 deaths, crippling the transportation network, and leaving thousands of homes flooded
(Xu, 2015).
This research focuses specifically on how to use GI to solve these urban environmental
problems, especially urban greenspace shortage and urban flooding. To deal with them, the
Chinese central government enacted two milestone programs. The first is the 1992
‘National Garden City’ campaign launched by the Ministry of Construction to encourage
cities to improve urban ecosystems and build livable cities (Jin, Chen, & Ma, 2015).
Accordingly, many cities, like Beijing, Nanjing, Hefei, etc., have taken stock of their
existing urban GI and tried to increase their urban green space to meet the Garden City
standards (Huang, Yan, & Wu, 2016). Cities with severe land-use conflicts, including
1

Shanghai, have resorted to new forms of above-ground vertical greening, including green
roofs and green walls. Vertical greening can be an effective supplementary approach to
increase urban greening where land values are at a premium.
The second program is the 2014 Sponge City program, which proposes to use GI to
sustainably manage urban stormwater and reduce the dependency on gray infrastructure,
by increasing infiltration of rainwater and preserve water resources during times of drought
(Li, Ding, Ren, Li, & Wang, 2017). Greening measures promoted under this program
include green roofs, rain gardens, and bio-retention swales. GI, in addition to the
recognized recreational function, is thus supposed to play a role in urban stormwater
management. This new form and the new role of GI leads to challenges in both ideology
and empirical practice.
Environment-friendly city development can be expensive and challenging. For instance,
the Sponge City program requires an investment as high as 100-150 million CNY/km2,
which is a considerable financial burden for local governments (Li et al., 2017). Moreover,
GI development in cities always involves severe land-use conflict, as many GI projects are
installed on non-public lands (Chini, Canning, Schreiber, Peschel, & Stillwell, 2017; Ryan,
Fábos, & Allan, 2006). For this reason, the central government launched a Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) policy in 2014 to encourage the private sector to engage and invest in
the nation’s sustainable city initiatives (Tan & Zhao, 2019).
This dissertation examines the local-level policymaking and policy implementation
pertaining to these initiatives. In the four substantial chapters, each chapter addresses one
theoretical topic: policy entrepreneur, institutional response to club goods, quasi-publicprivate partnership, and policy goal ambiguity. Each is exemplified by a causal case study.
The first chapter addresses how the policy implementer acted as a policy entrepreneur
dedicating to green roof policy change in Shanghai. The second chapter examines how
institutional response may improve the club good (shopping mall roof garden) provision
when the private sector is engaged in club-based green space provision. The third chapter
investigates how a PPP policy transitioned to a Quasi-PPP when three basic PPP
2

assumptions were violated and failed to reap the PPP benefits. The fourth chapter focuses
on how policy goal ambiguity influences the policy outcome in the top-down Sponge City
program implementation.

3
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Abstract
Both the policy entrepreneur and policy implementer play critical roles in the policy
process. Policy entrepreneurs have been regarded as a main driver of agenda-setting and
policy change. Policy implementers are decisive in spotting problems associated with
implementation and ensuring policy-goal attainment. Yet, little attention has been devoted
to how the overlap of these two identities may influence agenda-setting and policy
adoption. This paper addresses this gap using a qualitative case study approach and
explores the vertical greening (VG) policymaking process in Shanghai (1992-2016), China.
In this case, the head of the Shanghai Greening Committee (SGC, the municipal
greenspace-policy implementer) acted as a de facto policy entrepreneur, and skillfully
employed incremental strategies to advance the VG policy agenda forward through three
phases. This paper advances three conclusions. (1) The identity of policy implementer
prompts the entrepreneurial tactics by detecting the barriers in implementation and
motivates the policy entrepreneur to remove these barriers. (2) The discrepancy in
perception of the policy-goal ambiguity between the policy implementer and policymaker
may compromise policy adoption. (3) The dual identity does not prevent the policy
entrepreneur from maintaining a flexible attitude to accept compromises in order to have
the policy passed.
Keywords: policy entrepreneur; policy implementer; dual role; vertical greening policy;
Shanghai; China
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1.1 Introduction
Policy entrepreneurship is often regarded as a causal mechanism of agenda-setting
(Hopkins, 2016) and driver of policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Entrepreneurs
are often at the center of U.S. environmental policy innovation, building coalitions to
advance their cause using a variety of resources (Rabe, 1999). Another important actor in
the policy process is the policy implementer, who carries out the established public
policies. Their skills and commitment, and capability to adapt the policy to local
conditions, enable policy goal attainment (Matland, 1995). Given the local implementers’
deep understanding and knowledge of on-the-ground problems, they are often in a better
position to initiate purposeful policy.
Here we examine how policy adoption is affected by a policy implementer’s
experience combined with a policy entrepreneur’s strategies, in an in-depth case study of
urban vertical greening (VG) in Shanghai, China. Although in practice, policy
implementers initiating and advocating for specific policies is not uncommon, theoretical
exploration of this situation has not been given equal attention. Bakir (2009) examines how
the policy entrepreneur’s multiple high-profile identities as decision-maker, theorist,
framer, and mediator (plus a considerable influence in transnational and domestic policy
communities) enables the entrepreneur to operate in different ideational realms towards
desirable institutional change. Frisch-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2018) found that the lowlevel bureaucrats who implement the policy can influence the shaping of policy through
their professional knowledge and understanding the needs of the public; yet their research
focused more on how the governance regime affects the ability of these bureaucrats to act
as policy entrepreneurs. We contribute to the literature by investigating how the identity as
a local policy implementer may influence the entrepreneurial efforts towards the policy
change of an esoteric issue in a centralized political regime. This paper argues that this dual
identity has both pros and cons, but does not prevent the policy entrepreneur from making
progress in the specific political context. For the following parts, first, we review the
literature on both policy entrepreneur and policy implementer, followed by the
methodology. We then identify the problem and the policy entrepreneur, detailing the
6

policy entrepreneur’s strategies in the three-phase VG policymaking process in Shanghai.
Finally, we discuss and summarize our main findings.

1.2 Policy entrepreneur and policy implementer
The concept of policy entrepreneur is well defined (Kingdon, 1995) as are their
strategies (Cairney, 2018; Faling, Biesbroek, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, & Termeer, 2018;
Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Mintrom and Norman (2009) use a four-element framework
which includes problem defining, social acuity displaying, team building, and leading by
example, to identify policy entrepreneurs and analyze their strategies. In a similar vein,
Faling et al. (2018) identify five categories of frequently-adopted entrepreneurial
strategies: issue promotion, issue framing, coalition building, manipulating institutions,
and leading by example. These entrepreneurial strategies are well elaborated in case
studies. For instance, Meijerink and Huitema (2010) examine how policy entrepreneurs
use smaller-scale implementation to gain experience with proposed policies.
Although the concept of policy entrepreneur originated in democratic political
systems, it has proved to be applicable to non-democratic regimes like China (Hammond,
2013). He (2018) finds that personal traits, political capital, network position, and
institutional framework influence the entrepreneurial activities in the medical system
reform in Sanming, China. Zhu (2008) explores how policy entrepreneurs used the strategy
of technical infeasibility to push policy change for urban vagrants and beggars in China.
However, Hammond (2013) finds that existing frameworks do not completely explain the
Chinese minimum living guarantee policy process, and advocates for more research on the
applicability of policy entrepreneur frameworks to determine whether modifications are
necessary in the Chinese context.
Compared to the policy entrepreneurs, less attention is devoted to policy implementers
(Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2014). Policy implementation usually depends on civil
servants and administrative officials to enact the policy, though other non-government
actors may also be involved (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009). Here we highlight two
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factors that may influence implementation: policy-goal ambiguity and public support for
the policy.
According to Noordegraaf (2010), policy formation implies intricate politicoadministrative interactions between politicians and policy administrators. The former,
including the policymaker, contributes interests and values; the latter, including policy
implementers, focuses on facts and knowledge. It is expected that high-rank decisionmakers will provide implementers with clear policy goals and directions, which is not
always the case (Howlett et al., 2009). Cairney and Kwiatkowski (2017) maintain that
many policymakers do not fully understand the policy problems they must address. They
may also choose ambiguous solutions to ill-defined problems to take advantage of a policy
window (Cairney, 2018).
Public support for a policy can influence both policy adoption (Cairney, 2018) and
policy implementation (Howlett et al., 2009). Sometimes the government may want to keep
the issue esoteric or simply to transfer it from a political debate into a more technical
concern in order to ease the public concern or reduce opposition (Bakir, 2005). While in
other cases, either the government or the advocates may try to make the esoteric issue more
public, meanwhile to promote their pet solution (Faling et al., 2018). In Philadelphia,
Madden (2010) found that the policy entrepreneur advocated for the use of green
infrastructure for urban stormwater mitigation through the media. Similarly, in Cleveland,
officials found that media attention on an unsuccessful stormwater mitigation project
resulted in a bad relationship with the public, making it difficult to justify the project
expenditures and further impeded policy implementation (Keeley et al., 2013). In China,
the media is usually employed as an instrument to propagate political ideology and public
policies (Pan, 2000). The way the mass media prioritizes certain issues influences the
public’s judgment and acceptance (Wang, 2008).
There are increasing appeals for more interaction between policymaking and policy
implementation. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) argued that the policy-formation
process provides implementers critical clues about the intensity of demands, and the size,
stability, and degree of consensus among those demanding change. Winter (1986) found
8

that many implementation barriers occur at the initial stages of the policymaking process,
especially policy formulation. It is often more effective for policy-makers to deliberate the
implementation challenges and response ex-ante instead of ex-post (Linder & Peters,
1990). Matland (1995) suggests that local policy implementers can propose new policies
given their knowledge of policy problems and context. Given our current understanding of
the role of policy entrepreneurial activities and policy implementation feedbacks, it would
be prudent to examine these roles from an integrated perspective.

1.3 Methodology
We employ a case-study approach to analyze the VG policymaking process in
Shanghai, which is the first city in China to mandate VG. Our focus on Shanghai is due to
its pioneering performance in VG policymaking, and because the lead author has
professional experience in Shanghai’s landscape industry and thus has developed good
interpersonal networks allowing for relatively easier access to the potential key informants
and data. This privileged access enables the author to achieve a greater depth of knowledge
than available from superficial official accounts, and better understand the perception and
motivation of the key protagonists (Rhodes & Noordegraaf, 2007).
The empirical data are collected from both primary and secondary sources. In order
to better understand elite behavior and avoid getting non-neutral and biased answers, we
collected first-hand data through participant observations/shading managers and semistructured interviews (Noordegraaf, 2014). Between 2008-2016, the author attended the
annual Shanghai International Vertical Greening and Building Greening Exhibitions to
observe the public and market response to VG. Field trips to the VG projects in the Expo
2010 Shanghai, as well as engagement in the program of 2016 Top-100 VG projects
ranking, demonstrated how the SGC tried to arouse public interest in VG through mass
media. Other observing opportunities include listening to Li’s speech or luncheon
conversations with Li at some meetings etc.
Key-informant interviews at both city and district levels were conducted. In January
2016, the lead author conducted in-depth interviews with the key protagonist, the director
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of SGC (Li Li), as well as the vice director (Guoqiang Sun), in the office of Shanghai
Administration of Greening and City Appearance (SAGCA). Interview questions include
why they were interested in VG, what kind of strategies were used to advance the policy
agenda, how important city events may have influenced the VG policy, and why they
wanted to mandate VG in the law. Another critical city-level interviewee is Xiangmao Li,
municipal VG project supervisor of the Shanghai Station of Landscape Management, who
is in charge of the quality and financial incentive of VG projects and has close contact with
district implementers. Questions concerning the compilations and implementation of
technical standards and the evaluation of the financial incentive plan were asked. Though
VG is proposed city-wide, usually it is more popular in the densely-populated urban center.
To have a comprehensive picture of the VG implementation, the lead author also
interviewed district-level SGC officials from both urban districts of Jing`an, Zhabei,
Changning, Yangpu and suburban districts of Minhang, Chongming and Fengxian.
Questions about the challenges for districts when each is assigned the heavy annual task of
VG area-development and about the entrepreneurial efforts of Li Li were asked. These
district-level interviewees are frontline policy implementers. They have the best
knowledge about VG policy implementation, and they report directly to municipal SGC,
or Li.
We collected secondary data from open sources including official documents and
government websites. This included annual data for the VG area from the Yearbook of
Shanghai Greening and City Appearance and presented in Figure 1.1, and VG technical
standards from official documents including policy booklets and white papers, as well as
the official website of SAGCA and displayed in Table 1.1. We gathered data about the
VG public education and awareness-raising activities from mass media, including Xinmin
Evening News, Jiefang Daily, and the internet media of Sina.com.cn and Eastday.com and
showed in Table 1.2.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Since the research involves
information spanning over two decades, sometimes the interviewees could only provide
the name or keywords of an event. Therefore, to verify the accuracy and to probe further
into the details, we often turned back to the documents. The respondents were allowed to
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confirm the transcripts. We also triangulated all the data collected from observation,
interview, and document review for validity.

1.4 Severe urban greenspace shortage and identifying the policy
entrepreneur
The compact-city urbanization model in China has led to intense land-use conflict,
which squeezes out necessary urban greenspace. In response, the Chinese Ministry of
Construction launched a ‘National Garden City’ campaign in 1992 (Jin, Chen, & Ma,
2015). One criterion of the campaign requires that a candidate city’s ground-level public
greenspace area reaches at least 5 m2 per capita; while in 1993, Shanghai’s was only 1.15
m2 (Hu, 1994). In the following years, the Shanghai Garden Administration, especially its
in-house department of Shanghai Greening Committee (SGC, responsible for municipal
greenspace development), together with SGC’s branches in each district, worked to
increase urban greenspace to meet the ‘Garden City’ target. Besides ground-level
greenspaces, VG (which includes green walls, green roofs, and other forms of aboveground greening measures) was proposed to address the urban greenspace shortage.
After a decade’s efforts, in 2003, Shanghai was finally entitled ‘Garden City’ when
the greenspace reached 7.6 m2 per capita (Jin et al., 2015). The Garden City criteria were
not only an indicator of the city’s greenspace shortage, but a reminder of how difficult and
expensive ground-level green space development could be in urban areas. For instance, to
develop the Yanzhong greenspace, which covered an area of 28 ha in the city center, the
government relocated over 10,000 households and 400 enterprises. The cost of land
acquisition alone was as high as 120 million Yuan/ha (Hu, 2018). The financial challenges
further inspired SGC to try out VG, which saved land-acquisition costs. At that time, VG
was an esoteric topic and the central government neither paid much attention to nor
included it in the national Garden City criteria. Thus, VG policymaking was at the
discretion of the local government and left the potential policy entrepreneur space to
operate.
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Macro political setting may indirectly influence agenda setting through the emergence
of policy entrepreneurs. Araral and Amri found that in non-liberal democracies, “policy
actors like think tanks, interest groups and media may not play similarly important roles in
shaping the policy agenda as in mature liberal democracies” (2016, p. 80) and the exclusion
of outside actors potentially inhibits outside policy entrepreneurs. This is largely true in
China (Zhu, 2008), though in recent years the rise of the internet has made popular pressure
a strong force in agenda setting (Wang, 2008). However, for VG, as a kind of public good
with largely indirect and chronical economic or social benefits, there are rarely outside
interest groups or lobbyists involved.
Nevertheless, in the following policy development process, a proactive insider, the
head of the SGC, Li Li, was a key actor. She devoted considerable time and energy to
continuously influence policymaking towards its desirable outcome: legitimizing the VG
in the municipal greening law. Li, a native of Shanghai was a horticultural specialist, who
worked in the Shanghai Botanical Garden and the Shanghai Station of Landscape
Management for years before she was promoted to work for the then Shanghai Garden
Administration in 1998 until her retirement in 2016. In almost two decades, she
strategically maneuvered the VG development and policy agenda, from VG policy
experimentation to institutionalize VG in the law. Her efforts to promote VG included
giving speeches at important conferences, organizing demonstration-site field trips to
familiarize the district-level officials with VG, inviting researchers including the lead
author of this paper to conduct studies on foreign VG policies, and compiling brochures as
propaganda material to educate the public.
Her work-related identity transition from a technical expert to a public manager
implied new managerial knowledge and skill learning. When Li became head of SGC, she
paid a great deal of attention to team building. During the interview with Li, she invited
SGC’s deputy director to join her and emphasized several times that if there is any
achievement in Shanghai’s VG development, it was attributable to the efforts of the whole
team instead of herself alone. Though challenging, Li was persistent and always kept
encouraging her team. This was particularly the case during the World Expo 2010
Shanghai. There, she urged SGC members to get out of the office to visit and study the
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Expo VG as much as possible. When mentioning that more professionals are now engaged
in VG research and development, Li said: ‘compared with our initial stumbling years to
introduce VG in the city, the situation becomes much better now.’ Many other interviewees
determined that without Li, VG development and policymaking in Shanghai may have
never materialized. Thus, Li can, according to Kingdon’s definition (1995), be considered
as a policy entrepreneur of the Shanghai VG policy. Her entrepreneurial efforts can be
divided into three phases.
Phase 1: Policy experimentation and feedback from pilot projects
When promoting new technologies or new concepts, policy entrepreneurs usually
conduct small-scale experimentation to gain experience (Faling et al., 2018; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009). Li started VG by establishing pilot projects and policy experimentation at
the district level. Jing`an, a district in the city center with a high population density, had
the strongest motivation to install VG to partially mitigate land-use conflicts. Since 2001,
Li worked with Jing`an SGC to build 47 VG demonstration sites. Most pilot projects were
implemented on public buildings, particularly governmental buildings. Li also directed the
Jing`an SGC in institutionalizing roof greening. In 2002, the first VG policy at the district
level, the Implementation Opinion on Roof Greening of Jing`an District, Shanghai (Trial)
(People's Government of Jing`an District, 2002) was formulated and put into effect. This
policy incentivizes all new buildings or feasible retrofitting projects for green roofs at 10
Yuan/m2, making it eligible for the award of ‘Advanced Unit in Greening’.
Working models for proposed changes can help provide important information about
program effectiveness and practicality (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). The pilot projects and
the trial policy in Jing`an brought both positive and negative feedback to SGC. On the
positive side, the demonstrations encouraged several districts to mimic the efforts, though
still in small scales (H. M. Lu, 2016). By October 2004, there was about 12 ha of rooftop
greened in Shanghai (Yang, Zhang, & Nie, 2008). The trials also enriched SGC’s
experiences and made Li more confident in VG development. Nevertheless, these positive
influences on insiders do not necessarily ease the prevailing public concerns.
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Barriers arising from policy experimentation
Several barriers were identified during the policy experimentation phase. The first
involved legal support. Although VG occurs above ground level, it does require usage
rights of structures including roofs or walls. For example, when proposing VG projects,
SGC officials first have to persuade the occupants/developers to allow the roof or wall to
be greened. Usage rights involve different parties, including developers, property
management companies, and occupants. Most of these parties are not from the greening
sector and are not knowledgeable about VG. The second barrier is technical in nature.
Occupants worry about the load-bearing potential of the building, the plant root
penetration, mosquitoes and insects, and how to keep the roof greenings safe during
typhoon seasons. The third regards funding, specifically responsibility for installation and
management costs. While ground-level greenspace projects are usually included in annual
government budgets, VG installations are not. Ignoring land acquisition costs, VG’s
installation and maintenance costs are higher than ground-level greenspaces (Claus &
Rousseau, 2012). The fourth is an assumed low social-environmental value. Many of the
pilot green roofs are not open to the public and are not designed for recreation. Their
inaccessibility and invisibility made roof greening less attractive to the public. Some
professionals also doubted the ecological benefits of roof greening, which at that time
usually contained only light-weight sedums and grasses (R. Li, 2007).
Phase 2: Policy amendment to encourage VG in the municipal law
Li realized the above-mentioned concerns may directly or indirectly impede VG
development. Meanwhile, she was also eager to upgrade the district-level policy to the city
level to legalize VG and spark a VG trend in the city. From an implementer’s perspective,
representing VG in the law will make the VG policy implementation more
legitimate. However, before Li had time to solve these problems, she identified an
unexpected policy window from the agency merger.
Seize the first policy window without solving the implementation barriers
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Rapid urbanization brought about not only greenspace shortage, but also greenspace
administrative challenges in Shanghai. Successful green space policy often requires the
integration of regional governmental units that oversee greening and urban planning (Ma,
2007). In 2004, the two greening authorities, the Shanghai Gardening Administration (for
urban areas) and the Shanghai Agriculture and Forestry Administration (for rural areas)
merged and became the ‘Shanghai Greening Administration’. Soon after, the greening law
Shanghai Regulations of Planting and Greening (which did not mention VG at all) was
proposed for amendment to adapt to the post-merging administration. This unintentionally
created an opportunity for a VG policy window.
In 2005, the new Shanghai Greening Administration set out to amend the greening
law. Li saw a great opportunity to put VG on the institutional agenda. Given the abovementioned implementation barriers, she proposed two modest clauses about VGs for the
amendment: (1) to encourage VG in the city; (2) to require that new public buildings with
feasible structures undergo roof greening. As to the second clause, this city-level law is not
as strict as the Jing`an policy, which requires all new roofs to be greened. SGC’s proposal
was accepted and in 2007 the old regulation, which had been in effect for 20 years, was
amended and renamed ‘Shanghai Greening Regulations’. This is the first time that VG was
represented in the municipal law.
Nevertheless, the law ‘to encourage’ VG development was rather weak (Feng, 2012).
For instance, both the technical instructor in the Shanghai Station of Landscape
Management and district SGC officials stated that the building developer/occupants
usually did not have the intention to green their roofs. When the officials visited them in
person and informed them of the new law as well as the governmental encouragement,
their focus was on the direct benefits to the developer. Hence, the modest term
‘encouragement’ created a second policy window.
Phase 3: Reducing implementation barriers and the second policy-window
For Li, the 2007 VG amendment was the first step of mandating VG in the law. To
implementers, mandating is like an implementing order with the highest authority
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(Hammond, 2013), which can reduce implementing difficulty. Li realized that only when
the policy became feasible and acceptable to enough policy actors, would such a radical
policy change become possible. In the following years, she committed to removing or
reducing these barriers, with specific attention to establishing technical standards, funding,
and acceptability. The upcoming big city event of World Expo 2010 Shanghai was a good
opportunity to do so.
Reframing the issue and turning the tide via the World Expo 2010 Shanghai
Howlett et al. (2009) argue that both political and economic factors are important
determinants and can influence the timing and content of specific policy initiatives. The
World Expo 2010 Shanghai was an important ‘political and economic event’ and Li’s
social acuity enabled her to seize this opportunity. First was substantial VG-projectdevelopment framing. To welcome the Expo, the municipality used all resources to retrofit
and beautify the city. Meanwhile, in 2008, the Shanghai Greening Administration was
again merged with the Shanghai Administration of City Appearance and Sanitation and
renamed as ‘Shanghai Administration of Greening and City Appearance’ (SAGCA).
Besides greening, the new authority’s purview expanded to city appearance and urban
management. Expo-oriented city retrofitting became the top concern of SAGCA. Li
proposed to vertically beautify the city by establishing greening on the roofs, the walls, the
trellises, and the balconies. In the following three years (2008-2010), many VG projects
were successfully completed. The second was the increased-public-awareness framing. To
Li, more encouraging was that this Expo was a multinational showcase of buildinggreening designs and technologies. Almost half of the 289 pavilions were equipped with
roof or wall greening (L. Li, 2010). Li recognized that such a high VG rate was a strong
indicator: “We (SGC) want to let people know that VG is not the single-minded goal of the
Shanghai authority, rather it has already become a worldwide trend, which is manifest in
this Expo” (L. Li, 2010).
SGC collaborated with the SAGCA-sponsored Garden magazine and published three
special issues of ‘Expo Vertical Greening’ and a book entitled Pavilion Greenings of Expo
2010 Shanghai, China, both with the focus on VG technologies. SGC also organized many
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field trips and workshops in the Expo Park to inform governmental officials, professionals,
and citizens about the eco-benefits as well as the aesthetic value of VG. Expo 2010 became
a turning point in VG development in Shanghai (Sun & You, 2012).
Post-Expo: reducing implementation barriers through institutional networking
Before the Expo, Li largely operated within the greening administration. The Expo
mobilized almost every sector to collaborate and commit to the shared city goal. This
suggested that there were more outside resources could be used and Li began to identify
cross-sectoral resources through institutional networking.
Establishing technical standards
The first step was to make technical standards to improve the safety of VG projects. As
shown in Table 1.1, the first two specifications were made right after the 2007 amendment,
yet all others were made after the Expo. Although all these standards were initiated and
established by SGC, they were usually co-issued by SAGCA and other related institutions.
Alliances with other more powerful institutions imply not only the increased authority of
these standards, which is conducive to compliance, but also promote roof acquisition for
VG installation because the planning or housing agencies are responsible for the roof
regulations. As more VG projects were implemented and inspected following these
standards, the public and property owner/occupants’ worries about technical issues like
leakage and safety decreased.
Table 1.1 Technical standards made under the direction of SGC
Year

Title

Issued by

2008 Technical Specifications for Roof Greening (Trial)

SGA

2009 Technical Manual for Green Walls

SGA, SSLM

2014 Technical Specifications for Green Building Planting

SAGCA, SAPLR

2015

Technical

Guide

for

the

Viaduct

Construction
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Pier

Greening

SAGCA, SSLM

2015

2015

Provisional Regulations for the Management of Viaduct
Pier Greening Project

SAGCA, STC

Operating Procedure of New Building Vertical Greening SAGCA, SAPLR,
Planning Control

SCURC

Source: Compilation of Shanghai Vertical Greening Documents (SAGCA & Shanghai
Station of Landscape Management, 2015)
Note: SGA: Shanghai Greening Administration
STC: Shanghai Transportation Committee
SAPLR: Shanghai Administration of Planning and Land Resource
SCURC: Shanghai Committee of Urban-Rural Construction
SSLM: Shanghai Station of Landscape Management
Issue promotion and public-support mobilization through media
Li understood that both the media and the public were critical policy actors, and
capitalized on the media resources to make the VG more acceptable to the public. Since
most green roofs were not open to the public, Li made full-range ‘watching, listening, and
touching’ plans to soften up the public. The mobilization work involved three types (Table
1.2): online ranking for top VG projects in the city; persuading the SAGCA director to
speak on the radio about VG; and organizing citizen field trips to VG projects. Li and her
team members usually acted as an on-site interpreter. The pilot projects constructed in the
early 2000s have been proven safe and cost-efficient, encouraging more development. For
each event, the media were always invited and involved. For example, the large-scale
‘Ranking for Shanghai’s Top 100 VG Projects’ in 2015 lasted for three months and most
of the local media were invited for full coverage. These public participation activities
familiarized citizens with VG and created a supportive atmosphere, which was beneficial
for policy adoption and implementation.
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Table 1.2 Publicity for VG through media resources
Year
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Publicity

Media engaged

-Rating top 10 VG projects in Shanghai through
www. sina.com
-March 12th ‘Arbor Day’ Propaganda of greenspace Xinmin Evening News
and VG
Jiefang Daily
th
-March 12 ‘Arbor Day’ Propaganda of greenspace
Wenhui Po
and VG
www.sina.com
- ‘Cooling Summer’: to organize citizens for sitewww.eastdaily.com
visiting of VG projects
-SAGCA head spoke on a radio program about VGs Garden magazine
in Shanghai

Shanghai Greening and

-Rating top 100 VG projects in Shanghai

City Appearance

-To organize citizens for site-visiting of VG projects Shanghai TV
-March 12th ‘Citizen’s Greening Day’ Propaganda of Shanghai People’s
Broadcast
greenspace and VG
-March 12th ‘Citizen’s Greening Day’ Propaganda of
greenspace and VG

Source: authors compiled according to the local media coverage, SAGCA websites etc.
To increase the VG area and reach out for funding
To increase the VG area was the ultimate objective of the VG policies. Before the Expo,
voluntary VG installation resulted in 98 ha of VG in the city. In 2011, Li proposed a total
of 150 ha of VG in the municipal 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015), which was assigned to
each district’s annual plan. In 2014, another important city event, the Conference on
Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) was held in Shanghai. To
welcome CICA, Li added an extra 10 ha of VG to the annual plan of 2014 (H. M. Lu,
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2016), which exceeded the targets of the 12th Five-year VG Plan, and boosted the
benchmark of the annual city plan from 30 ha to 40 ha in the 13th Five-Year plan.

Figure 1.1 Annual installation area of vertical greening in Shanghai during
2011-2018*
*Data sourced from Yearbook of Shanghai Greening and City Appearance.
To advocate for a policy without any financial support is risky (Hammond, 2013). The
annual plan can be made by the greening agency alone, yet to acquire funding entails crossagency negotiation. Given the fragmented bureaucracy in China, the greenspace funding
involved institutions like the Shanghai Financial Bureau, Shanghai Commission of
Development & Reform, Shanghai Administration of Planning and Land Resource, and the
Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau. After lengthy and difficult negotiations, in
2012, the VG program was added to the municipal building energy-saving program (20122015) with dedicated funding support. In these three years, about 28% of the new VG area
was subsidized (SAGCA, 2017). The incentive varied between 50-200 Yuan/m2 according
to the VG type, which was much higher than the 10 Yuan/m2 in the Jing`an’s pilot policy.
Nevertheless, given the rising prices, this 50-200 Yuan subsidy covered only around 2030% of the construction costs.
Li soon realized that this incentive policy’s size limit was too restrictive, requiring a
minimum VG area of 1,000 m2. Given the small-scale and scattered nature of VG projects,
the criteria greatly constrained the number of qualified projects. Also, 20-30% of
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construction cost coverage was too low. So, in the second three-year (2016-2019) program,
she appealed to the Shanghai Committee of Development & Reform (SCDR) to lower the
size threshold and to increase per square meter funding, yet did not succeed. The SCDR
responded that all other sectors’ funding criteria improve year by year, there was no reason
to lower only the greening sector’s threshold.
Second policy amendment: ‘mandating vertical greening’ in the law
All of Li’s political, technical, and publicity efforts were focused on streamlining the
VG policy implementation. As an implementer, she understood the challenge to each
district for fulfilling those annual plans. Many of these problems arose from the interaction
of a policy with the street-level institutional context, and implementers who are often
required to respond even when resources are insufficient (Shonkoff, 2000). As one district
SGC official claimed, ‘We often find insufficient authorities and powers when negotiating
with building owners/developers’. Li determined that legislation would be the most
efficient solution to these challenges and would greatly relieve the pressure on the districtlevel SGC implementers. In 2014, Li again proposed the amendment of the Shanghai
Greening Regulations (SAGCA, 2015). Given the hitherto elaborate preparations, Li was
confident enough to propose two mandatory clauses: (1) all new public buildings in
Shanghai no higher than 50 m must be greened and (2) cover at least 30% of roof area
(SAGCA, 2015). However, in the legislative process, the ‘30%’ was removed and replaced
by ‘the percentage is to be decided by the government’. The new amendment was put into
effect on 1st October 2015. This compulsory stipulation of VGs on public buildings was
novel in China and set an example for other cities (H. Li, 2015). For instance, Shenzhen,
another Chinese metropolis, also amended its greening regulation by adding similar clauses
in 2016.

1.5 Discussion and conclusions
Bakir and Jarvis (2017) have suggested contextualizing policy entrepreneurship by the
interaction of various factors at multi-level contexts: structural, or the broader material and
cultural contexts; institutional, i.e. both formal and informal rules; and agency levels, the
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agent’s social position or multiple identities in the same agency. In the case of VG in
Shanghai, we can better understand the entrepreneurial strategies and tactics from both the
agency and political regime contexts.
Looking from the agent or individual level, we found that Li was very skilled in using
the entrepreneurial strategies presented in Mintrom and Norman’s (2009) four-element
framework, where the element of ‘problem definition’ is replaced by the ‘issue promotion
through media’. (1) Li conducted policy experimentation in the Jing’an district, which
paved the way for “encouraging VG” in the law. (2) Through the exhibition window of
Expo 2010 Shanghai, she reframed the VG issue as a world trend and this ‘world trend’
enabled her to propose annual VG targets in the city-wide 12th Five-year plan. (3) Her
social acuity also allowed her to reach out and to improve the authority and legitimacy of
this VG initiative, by networking with horizontal administrations to issue the technical
standards, or by persuading the upper-tier director-general of SAGCA to speak on the radio
for VG. While as a horticultural expert, Li could have publicized the effort, she realized
that the involvement of higher-rank officials would increase political authority for VG (He,
2018). As to the fourth strategy of problem-definition in the Mintrom-Norman framework,
the problem was already defined here, since the ‘problem’ is urban greenspace shortage
manifested by the indicator of greenspace per capita.
What we want to highlight is another strategy beyond this framework: (4) issue
promotion through mass media. Successful policy change requires widespread support
from the public (Wang, 2008). Exoteric issues that involve the redistribution of a city’s
limited resources, like the college matriculation policy for migrant workers’ children,
easily generate extensive public debates and automatically move onto the policy agenda
(Zhou & Feng, 2014). Conversely, VG’s esoteric nature caused it to be overlooked by the
government and almost invisible to the media and the general public.
To better understand Li’s last strategy, it is necessary to take a broader perspective.
Embedded in a Chinese centralized context, the implications of VG’s low-profile nature
are twofold for a policy entrepreneur. On the one hand, a topic high on the central
government’s agenda means top-town regulation may happen, which will save local
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entrepreneurial efforts. For the severe urban flooding problem, which can cause
tremendous direct loss, the central government implemented the nationwide Sponge City
program to deal with it (Zhang, Li, & Wang, 2016). However, this is not the case for VG
and the convenient door was closed. Li had to expand the issue and advance the policy
agenda through her own efforts. Conversely, the centralized political regime still opened a
window for her to capitalize on the media resources. The relationship between the Chinese
government and the media is like supervisor-subordinate (Wang, 2008). This enabled Li to
readily levy almost all the possible media resources, including TV, broadcast, website, and
social media to make the VG issue exoteric and publicize the VG solution in a positive
way.
At the agency level, the identity overlap of entrepreneur-implementer has both
advantages and disadvantages towards policy adoption. The advantage allowed Li to spot
problems associated with implementation. Through frequent interactions, including routine
quarterly meetings with the district SGC officials, Li received feedback directly from
frontline implementers and used it while she advanced the policy agenda. Cairney (2018)
argues that policy entrepreneurs usually have a solution ready to chase a problem. As an
implementer, Li understood the policy problem and figured out the policy solution. As a
result, Li’s entrepreneurial tactics were especially implementation-oriented, like
establishing technical standards, ensuring funding, increasing public acceptance, and
promoting annual plans. When she found that the installation costs of VGs were higher
than ground-level installation, she pursued financial support, although was not successful
in lowering qualification requirements for funding. Her efforts reduced implementation
barriers and made the policy more acceptable to policymakers.
The disadvantage lies with the discrepancy in perception of the policy-goal ambiguity
between the policy implementer and policymaker. For policymakers, sufficient language
ambiguity allows different stakeholders to interpret the same policy differently and is an
inevitable part of the political process (Baier, March, & Saetren, 1986; Berman, 1978).
Oftentimes ambiguity is a prerequisite for getting new policies passed at the legitimation
stage, with problems that cannot be immediately addressed buried in an ambiguous text to
wait for later solutions (Matland, 1995). However, implementers are pragmatic and action23

oriented (Shonkoff, 2000). Goal ambiguity results in substantial misunderstanding and
uncertainty and is often culpable for implementation failure (Matland, 1995). As an
implementer, Li preferred clear and operational policy goals like a minimum of 30%
greening coverage, which made implementation and monitoring easier. However, from a
policymaker’s perspective, such a clear goal would be too risky. In this sense, identity as
an implementer does not necessarily benefit policy adoption. This differs from Bakir’s
(2009) finding that policy innovation becomes more possible when the policy entrepreneur
has multiple identities in both domestic and international policy communities, and where
s/he can coordinate ideas and discourse in those communities. In this research, different
perceptions of policy goals between the policymakers and administrators were not able to
be removed by the policy implementer.
Nevertheless, a resolute and action-oriented implementer’s identity did not prevent Li
from keeping a flexible mindset. Usually, policy entrepreneurs seek to reduce potential
risks to decision-makers (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). In the last phase, with all the
technical, financial, and mobilization preparations made, Li’s identity as a policyimplementer allowed her to prescribe a 30% greening percentage, which was denied. An
effective policy entrepreneur is flexible and ready to make compromises (He, 2018). Li
was a senior official and knew when to step up and when to step back. The flexibility of an
effective policy entrepreneur enables her to accept compromises to get the policy passed.
This echoes Noordegraaf’s (2000) observation that public managers may not do what is
“best”, but what is regarded as “appropriate”. We may still expect a third amendment in
which the roof greening percentage would be added. However, now that the policy
entrepreneur has retired, will such a policy change happen?
Finally, we want to address the internal and external validity of this research.
Flyvbjerg (2006) suggested that a single case study can provide valid research outcomes
when the case in question is supposed to be sufficient and illustrative enough. Given our
research work conducted and the data collected, we believe that Shanghai presents such a
case. VG is too ‘trivial’ a topic to automatically attract the attention of interest groups, the
public, or the media; in this sense, entrepreneurship as an internal driver does contribute to
overall policy change though some compromises have to be made. Nevertheless, such an
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effort works in the landscape greening sector involving less political and interest conflicts.
For other sectors, like healthcare reform, with various political and vested interest
stakeholders opposing policy change, it would be expected that other entrepreneurial
strategies like to earn political capital (He, 2018) are needed towards the desirable policy
change.
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For-profit sustainability: The policy gaps and potential
of a club-good approach to shopping mall roof garden
development
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Abstract
Green space as a public good is usually provided by the government. However, in highdensity city centers, governments struggle to fulfill this responsibility given severe landuse conflicts. The club-good approach emerges as a potential market solution to this
problem. Club good is a subcategory of public goods that are provided by private or social
organizations to club members, featuring excludability and nonrivalry. Drawing on insights
from field investigations and interviews, this paper examines how better institutional
response may facilitate club-good’s sustainable development exemplified by the nascent
for-profit shopping mall roof garden (SMRG) development in Shanghai, China. SMRGs,
established by developers to serve mainly the mall customers, are in nature club goods.
This research finds that though the government appreciates SMRG’s positive externalities,
existing public policies are insufficient to support SMRG’s sustainability because they fail
to respond to SMRG’s positive externality and cross-sectoral nature, and cause financial,
legitimacy, and oversight gaps. This paper argues that appropriate institutional response
can better facilitate club-goods’ development by (1) optimizing policy design to internalize
club-goods’ external benefits and helping developers recover production costs; (2)
interdepartmental collaboration as a response to SMRG’s cross-sectoral nature to facilitate
conducive policy making and implementation.
Keywords: Club good; for-profit; SMRG; institutional response; sustainability
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2.1 Introduction
As an important element in city life, urban green space becomes indispensable during a
crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic; people want to seek recreation and solace in nearby
parks when indoor recreational places become inaccessible (Kleinschroth & Kowarik,
2020). Green space development and management are usually regarded as the
responsibilities of governments (Azadi, Ho, Hafni, Zarafshani, & Witlox, 2011). In
metropolises, these responsibilities become great challenges for governments given the
severe land-resource shortage. New Public Management suggests that complex social
problems like urban green space shortage can be addressed through public-private
collaboration (Azadi et al., 2011; Pincetl, 2003). When the private sector is engaged in
providing public goods, it may adopt a club-good approach (Prakash & Potoski, 2007),
which is a market solution to public good provision. A club-good approach means, by
securing private rights and restricting access, developers provide and manage the club
goods by forming a club of user homogeneity (Warner, 2011). In contrast to public goods
being accessible to everybody, access to club goods is usually limited to club members.
Club goods are typically excludable and non-rival. Examples of club goods include private
parks, toll roads, and cinemas (Turner, 2000; Warner, 2011). The advantages of a club
good approach lie with the potential of being more effective, innovative, and spontaneous
than government management and delivery. It can also relieve the government of
implementation concerns (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). Although the club-good approach is
efficient in matching club users’ interests with service delivery, it is criticized for its
exclusiveness and small scale, and may not be sufficient to support a sustainable city in the
long term (Warner, 2011). Webster and Lai (2003) question a club good approach for its
democratic legitimacy as it always privileges property-owner and business interests.
In densely populated cities, green spaces are often squeezed out, given a low priority,
and replaced by high-rises or other development. Residents then suffer an “urban penalty”
by being surrounded by impervious surfaces. As a remedy, many cities have instituted
policies and programs to increase green roofs, which are usually first encouraged on public
buildings (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In recent years, shopping malls have become a new
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source of green roof development. In Japan, roof gardens have been an indispensable
component of department store retrofitting plans since the Taisho period (Moeran, 2013).
Shopping Mall Roof Gardens (SMRGs) are established by mall developers to serve the
mall customers or by rooftop renters to serve specific groups (members). SMRGs are in
nature club goods, featuring both private ownership (excludable) and non-rivalrous use
(before congestion). In Shanghai, under the effect of fierce market competition, some
pioneering shopping malls started to establish roof gardens in the past decade.
SMRGs as club goods have two important features: positive externality and crosssectoral nature. Although the developers establish SMRGs largely for the economic
benefits, including increasing customer base and top-floor marketing (Carter & Fowler,
2008), SMRGs have positive externalities including ecological and social benefits that are
desired by both the government and the public. Usually covering thousands of square
meters, SMRGs are oases in city centers with obvious ecological benefits, such as reducing
urban flooding risks, mitigating air pollution, and increasing urban biodiversity (Carter &
Fowler, 2008; Claus & Rousseau, 2012), and become an important component of the urban
ecosystem. SMRGs also have prominent social benefits. Rahman, Ahmad, Mohammad,
and Rosley (2015) suggest that 47% of customers like to visit SMRG when they visit the
shopping mall. In Chinese urban neighborhoods, the limited public spaces are often
insufficient to offer landscaping, children’s playgrounds, or other amenities (X. Lu, 2018).
Communities without good access to ground-level gardens favor these SMRGs. In this
sense, SMRGs could be regarded as a type of voluntary environmental program, where
institutions could incentivize private companies to produce environmental goods beyond
legal requirements (Prakash & Potoski, 2012).
Meanwhile, although SMRGs are voluntary programs, they feature a cross-sectoral
nature and are subject to regulations by different municipal agencies. For example, as
elevated gardens, they are considered urban green spaces and are overseen by the greening
department. Second, when established on the top of buildings, they have building safety
concerns. Their construction design needs to be approved by the planning department.
Third, as the SMRG is a component of the business place, they undergo routine inspections
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from the fire department.
Preliminary studies show that many SMRGs have a sustainability problem. Dempsey
and Burton (2012) describe sustainable green spaces are those valued by users “who want
to visit them again and again” (P13). In this research, SMRG’s sustainability refers to (1)
the roof garden’s good status, including sufficient vegetation coverage, maintenance level,
and persistent upkeep; (2) increasing numbers of developers motivated and willing to
install roof gardens. Azadi et al. (2011) argue that green spaces’ sustainable provision is
premised on three conditions: physical environment support, socio-political support, and
financial support. Specifically, funding, management, oversight, evaluation, and
appropriate partnerships contribute to green spaces’ long-term existence (Fors, Molin,
Murphy, & van den Bosch, 2015).
SMRGs make a good case that the private sector provides a source of innovation to solve
problems of public goods provision and management (Webster & Lai, 2003). However,
Warner (2011) also suggests that club goods are not just spontaneous responses to urban
problems. They need legal and financial support from the government to sustain. For
policymakers, a voluntary SMRG program has two main goals. One is to induce the private
sector to produce good quality roof gardens (positive environmental externalities) and
ensure their adherence to program obligations; the other is to attract more private actors to
participate in the program. Exemplified by the SMRG development in Shanghai, this
research identifies the policy gaps and explores how to improve institutional design for the
sustainable development of club goods, which means more developers are motivated to
install and maintain good-quality SMRGs. The paper is structured as follows. The next two
sections are the literature review and methodology, followed by the gaps in the existing
policies that constrain SMRG’s sustainable development and the negative impacts of an
uncoordinated administrative system on SMRG’s development. The potential of an
enabling institutional environment is then analyzed.
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2.2 Literature review
The private sector has increasingly joined the government to collaboratively provide
green space as a public service (Fors et al., 2015). Some of these collaborative provisions
adopt a club good approach. In New York City, given the heavy competition for land, the
municipal government developed many incentive policies to encourage developers to
provide Privately-Owned Public Space (POPS) for the public’s use, which becomes an
important component of urban public spaces (Kayden, 2000). In a broad sense, POPSes are
club goods when they are owned and managed by private developers and the access is
somehow limited. Others may use a multiproduct approach, namely a mix of pure public
goods and club goods (McNutt, 1999). Turner (2000) suggests that the national park is a
good case of a multiproduct approach: it provides both public goods (wilderness
conservation) and club goods (recreational activities) for visitors; he modeled the
optimality conditions for the mixed public good provision by park managers. In California,
private developers engaging in the state or national park management use the revenues
from the developed recreational facilities or other fee items for the parks’ daily
maintenance and management (Gilroy, Kenny, & Morris, 2013). When well organized, the
private sector can use its resources and contribute to all aspects of green space
development, including lobbying, funding, marketing, and labor input for club goods
(Rosol, 2010).
In a club-good approach, as in most public-private collaborations, potential interest
conflict between the public and the private actors can create a great divergence between
the two parties and cause the private sector’s noncompliance (Prakash & Potoski, 2007).
The government wants to shape the service sector according to the interests of society as a
whole, while the private sector is more attentive to a specific group’s interests. Of course,
sometimes developers also want to create a green image through environment-friendly
activities like installing non-profit green roofs (Miller, 2014). But the private actors’
interests in engagement are mostly economic benefits from service/good development and
management (Azadi et al., 2011). Brunner (2011) finds that in Wisconsin, developers are
willing to convert brownfields into green space given the potential profits due to site
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location, as many brownfields are in urban areas and have good proximity to population
centers, transportation, and other resources. The government’s interests in brownfield
development include eliminating blight, removing eyesores, gentrifying neighborhoods,
increasing employment and tax revenue, and controlling urban sprawl by attracting the
commercial entities to urban cores (Wernstedt, Crooks, & Hersh, 2003). Prakash and
Potoski (2007) find that to maximize self-interest, the private actors may practice free
riding and shirking in collective action when a club approach is used in environmental
governance. Given these interest conflicts, the government needs to design policy tools to
guide the club-good provision towards a more sustainable direction. A club-good approach
can fail if some regulatory or supporting policies are absent (Prakash & Potoski, 2007).
Warner (2011) explores the club goods provision in the US, including urban amenity
infrastructure and waste management, and suggests that club-good production is usually
supported by the government in aspects of legal and administrative framework or finance
provisions.
The government also needs to intervene to optimize the club good’s provision when club
goods have externalities. The existence of an externality implies that the goods’ costs and
benefits are not fully internalized. Accordingly, governments may step in to regulate to
minimize negative impacts like pollution, while incentivizing more production of goods
with positive externalities (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). When the goods provision has
negative externalities, governments may step in to regulate to minimize negative impacts
like pollution or toxic release, The government may use regulations, standards, or sanctions
to urge the private sector to ensure the quality services/good (Prakash & Potoski, 2007).
The government can set standards to curb negative environmental externalities. Public
regulations are fair because governments respond to public interests instead of private
interests. Governments also have the capability to estimate the cost of externalities, design,
and enforce regulations to urge companies to internalize the negative costs.
For public/club goods with positive externalities, it is necessary to provide incentives to
internalize the external benefits, which will attract more private investors. A club-good
approach is in nature a public-private collaboration. Collaboration always needs to offer
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private investors something of material, social, or normative value in order to meet
investors’ interests or recover the costs (Verschuere, Brandsen, & Pestoff, 2012). In New
York City, if a POPS is provided by private developers, government designed incentives
can cover at least the costs incurred in providing the POPS. For example, the government
could allow the developer to build a taller building by increasing the Floor Area Ratio
(FAR). The private provision of one unit of POPS can acquire 2-14 units of bonus floor
area (Kayden, 2000).
Green roofs as club goods have many well-recognized positive externalities, as
previously mentioned. Thus, this FAR policy is also a very popular tool in encouraging
green roof establishment on private buildings (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In cities like
Chicago or Portland, Oregon, the FAR bonus is a popular indirect financial incentive. In
Chicago, the FAR bonus is decided based on the following formula (Carter & Fowler,
2008, p. 7):
Bonus FAR = (area of green roof over 50% of net roof area ÷ lot area)* 0.3 *Base FAR.
The most prominent positive externalities from green roofs stem from stormwater
management (Claus & Rousseau, 2012). In many countries, the stormwater tax is
implemented by local governments as the main incentive of private building’s green roof
establishment and upkeep, which produce stormwater tax credits (Miller, 2014). In other
cases, given the potential restriction of applying public funds to private properties, the
government may use alternative indirect financial policy tools like green building awards
or honoring demonstration sites to increase the private sector’s returns (Carter & Fowler,
2008). To support the service/goods sustainable provision, the private investor’s
interests/costs need to be sufficiently presented and discussed at the beginning of
collaboration (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008).
Green roof as a subcategory of green space has been extensively studied from
technological, policy tool, or life-cycle analysis perspectives (Carter & Fowler, 2008;
Claus & Rousseau, 2012). However, it has seldom been studied from a club-good
production perspective. SMRG is still an untapped research topic that received very limited
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academic attention. Moreover, to what extent a club-good approach can help governments
optimally provide public goods remains a challenge (McNutt, 1999). This research will
bridge the gap by exploring an enabling institutional environment to a club-good approach
to the green space shortage problem in high-density cities.

2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Study site
Shanghai is one of the metropolises in China at the forefront of SMRG development.
Shopping malls are often integrated into a city complex, which covers large lot areas (X.
Lu, 2018). Shopping malls boomed along with the big city event of World EXPO 2010
Shanghai, which brought great business opportunities to the city. As shown in Figure 2.1,
since 2010, every year there were dozens of malls established in the city. Booming mall
development intensified commercial competition. Meanwhile, online shopping threatened
to substitute city center shopping (Miller, 2014). To survive, new shopping malls are
designed to be one-stop city complexes by highlighting experience-economy development.
In addition to traditional stores and services, roof gardens are integrated into mall
development. Developers established SMRGs as a new tool to differentiate from their
competitors and take a bigger market share (Miller, 2014). A roof garden’s perceivable
benefits can motivate developers to voluntarily establish them, independent of policy
initiatives or government incentives (Carter & Fowler, 2008).
Given that SMRG remains a nascent industry, there is no specific official
documentation or statistics on it. The author used the municipal statistics of annual vertical
greening development datasets (including green roofs, green walls, and other forms of
above-ground greenings) to identify the SMRGs and verified them with the responsible
municipal officers.

38

Figure 2.1 Total number of shopping malls in Shanghai (2009-2019)
Note: Malls have business areas >30,000 m2, with few exceptions.
Source: Shanghai Commerce Development Research Center, 2018 and Shanghai Council
of Shopping Centers, 2019.
2.3.2 Data collection
Data collection focused on the SMRG’s sustainability, policy gaps identified by
administrators and developers, and the perceived policy solutions. Data were collected
through document review, field investigation, semi-structured interviews, and online
satisfaction evaluation from customers. The first step was to review official documents to
understand shopping-mall development and existing green-roof policies in the city. Then
online resources, especially the largest commercial customer feed-back sharing website
www.dianping.com was heavily used to learn about the user experience of SMRGs.
Field investigation and on-site interviews were conducted in the summers of 2016, 2017,
and 2019. The author visited 40 SMRGs in all. To make the field investigation sampling
representative, investigated SRMGs were selected according to the location, size, and age
(Appendix Table 2.3). Different time slots were chosen including weekdays and weekends,
daytime and night (sometimes after 22:00). Sustainability per se is a concept very difficult
to precisely evaluate (Hueskes, Verhoest, & Block, 2017). The author, based on the
municipal Green Roof Technological Guideline, used three basic indicators including
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sufficient vegetation coverage (>60%), maintenance level (>80% plants in good shape),
and persistent upkeep (>15 years) as a convenient reference to learn about the sustainability
status of SMRGs. Forty-two SMRG developers, onsite managers & gardeners, and 28
onsite visitors were interviewed. Of all the interviewees, developers and managers were
usually identified and recommended by the mall receptionist upon request; gardeners and
visitors were randomly met in the SMRGs. Interviews with six officials from the Shanghai
Administration of Greening and City Appearance (SAGCA) (both city-level and districtlevel) were arranged separately. Inquiries include SMRGs’ perceived challenges in the
process of management and operation; the relevance of existing green roof policies to
SMRGs and post-implementation monitors; the potential new policies to boost SMRG’s
development; government’s and developer’s interests in SMRG. Data from different
sources were triangulated to verify the validity.

2.4 Results
Of all the 295 malls developed during 2009-2019 in Shanghai, around 1/3 malls (101)
have SMRGs. Among the 40 surveyed SMRGs, the average size reaches 4,913 m2, much
larger than the non-mall roof gardens in the city (Table 2.1). In the surveyed SMRGs,
22.5% are completely open free to mall customers; 77.5% have various for-profit activities
located in the garden, with businesses ranging from youth equestrian club, garden center,
urban farm, mini zoo, to garden café/bar. Those non-profit SMRGs or the toll-free areas of
a for-profit SMRG partially serve as social spaces for public gatherings, especially when
shopping malls become not just commercially driven venues but the center of city life
(Miller, 2014). For instance, in the author’s field investigation, sometimes around 22:00,
there were still nearby residents hanging out in the SMRG. In one field survey, a young
couple commented: “Every weekend when we visit our parents who live nearby, we visit
this garden too. We actually want to move back as there is no such a nice garden near our
residence.” In this sense, these SMRGs complement the public green space shortage and
serve as public goods.
However, many SMRGs have sustainability concerns. According to the author’s
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investigation, around 60% of gardens have problems like low vegetation cover, poor
maintenance, or being abandoned in only a few years. These problems are also confirmed
by online users’ feedback from Dianping.com, as well as interviewees from the greening
department. For example, garden users’ complaints include the poor maintenance of
gardens, unexpected closure, smell from the rooftop flue pipe, or elevators not going to the
top floor. Kayden (2000) suggests that when the private developers innovate to engage in
the public good provision, it becomes relevant to look at the role of the government and to
detect the potential policy gaps in facilitating the goods’ quality and sustainability.
Table 2.1 A summary of the 40 SMRGs investigated in Shanghai
SMRGs
Location

Year of construction

Results
40% Inner ring; 47.5%

Divided by three rings on the

Middle; 12.5% Outer ring

municipal map

10% prior 2010; 30% 20112015; 57.5% 2016-2019

Average size

4,913 m2

Sustainability

40%

For-profit activities in
the SMRG

Accessibility
Evaluated by visitors
(dianping.com)

Notes

Equestrian club, garden
77.5%

center, urban farm, mini zoo,
café
20% closed in the author’s

80%

field trip

87.5%

Source: by author
2.4.1 Existing policies
Various green-roof policies have been developed in Shanghai, ranging from regulation
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to public education. However, all policies were designed for green roofs as public goods,
facilitating the green roof's establishment but without taking the green roof’s business
operation into consideration. Specifically, the two categories of regulation and incentives
are most relevant to SMRGs (Table 2.2). For regulations, one is the 2015 Shanghai
Greening Regulation, which stipulates a minimum of 30% of roof greening establishment
on new public buildings. Here public building means both public ownership or public
accessibility, including government buildings, schools, hospitals, and shopping malls. The
other is the annual vertical greening (mainly green roofs & walls) development plan,
requiring the city’s 16 districts to complete an overall construction plan of 400,000 m2/year,
which increasingly becomes a tough task after one decade’s implementation as feasible
roofs without an existing green roof decrease in the city.
For incentives, one is the 2012 direct subsidy policy. Different types of green roofs are
subsidized differently, ranging from 50 to 200 CNY /m2. According to the author’s
interview investigation, this incentive covers about 20% of an SMRG’s construction cost.
The other is the 2014 in-lieu policy. Any green-roof area not already receiving a subsidy,
and in excess of the compulsory 30% roof greening, can be counted to offset a maximum
of 15% of the required ground-level green space area. Developers can use the saved
ground-level green space to increase the first-floor building area or parking lots, but
according to the municipal planning regulation, the total FAR of the project will remain
unchanged. Usually, the increased first-floor building or parking area varies between
dozens or hundreds of square meters. According to some interviewees, compared with
SMRG’s high construction cost, this incentive is rather modest.
Table 2.2 Existing policies relevant to roof garden (RG) development
Policy tool
1

2

2015 Regulation

Annual plan

Content
New public buildings must green 30% of the applicable rooftop
area.
The city (16 districts) needs to establish 400,000 m2 /year of
vertical greenings.
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3

2012 Direct

Intensive RG

Semi-intensive RG

Extensive RG

subsidy

(garden-style)

(in-between)

(lawn-style)

200

100

50

(CNY/m2)

The green roof area in excess of the required 30% can be used to
offset a maximum of 15% of the required ground-level greening
area.
Type/Height of RG
4

2014 In-lieu
policy

Conversion Coefficient

Height (H) of

1.5<H≤12

0.7

green roof (m)

12<H ≤24

0.5

Intensive

1.0

Semi-intensive

0.7

Extensive

0.5

Type of green
roof

Source: author compiled according to government policy documents.
2.4.2 Policy-caused gaps in SMRG’s sustainability
Club goods with positive externalities are desired by both the public and governments.
Existing policies to different degrees encourage SMRG’s establishment, yet they are not
conducive to SMRG’s for-profit activities. In other words, current policies cannot monetize
SMRG’s positive ecological, social, or recreational benefits, which implies they can barely
help developers offset the payoffs (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). When the external benefits
are not internalized, the developers are not able to recover the production costs and
maintain the goods’ sustainability. Moreover, SMRG’s cross-sector nature entails
interdepartmental collaboration to design and implement policies effectively. Yet, such
collaboration is largely absent so far. Three policy-related gaps in terms of finance,
legitimacy, and oversight are identified.
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2.4.2.1 The financial gap
Claus and Rousseau (2012) compared the green roofs’ costs and benefits based on a
50-year life span to find that for private investors, the costs far exceed the benefits, when
the public ecological benefits include improved air quality, increased biodiversity, and
mitigated greenhouse gas emissions cannot be internalized. SMRGs, compared with other
green roofs, are much larger, and both the construction and maintenance costs have to be
paid by the private developers. Unfortunately, the direct governmental subsidy covers only
around 20% of SMRG’s construction costs. SMRG managers also frequently mentioned
the high maintenance expenditure including the irrigation cost in hot summer. The tiered
water rates made the garden’s water bill a big burden for garden developers. Given these
financial gaps, developers need to make ends meet by gaining revenues from garden-based
for-profit activities. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in Shanghai, most ground-level
public parks and gardens as public goods have been open to citizens for free since 2004,
except for some specialized ones such as the botanical garden, zoo, or classic gardens
(Jiang, 2005). The private developers could barely charge entrance fees for SMRGs
because of this public park’s free-entrance policy. What can be charged are the added
values based on the SMRG, like mall member’s kitchen gardens, horticultural DIY classes,
or children’s nature education. The revenue from these horticultural businesses is relatively
low. The more profitable businesses include garden cafés, garden restaurants, and youth
equestrian clubs. The equestrian club is among the highest return-on-investment rooftop
businesses; one equestrian class can be charged as high as 880 CNY (125 USD)/45 mins.
In the 31 for-profit SMRGs, over 25% have introduced the youth equestrian business.
Nevertheless, these businesses still have a legitimacy problem.
2.4.2.2 The legitimacy gap
Given SMRG’s cross-sector nature, a legitimacy problem arises in the process of
garden business operation. For-profit SMRGs are relevant to several departments including
the greening, urban planning, business, and fire department. As mentioned, the existing
green roof policies do not support SMRG’s for-profit business, which influences SMRG’s
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financial and management sustainability. As a nascent industry, SMRGs are not compatible
with the existing urban planning regulatory system, especially the FAR policy. According
to the planning regulation, SMRGs are not supposed to have any roofed structure, which
should be counted in a building’s pre-approved FAR. Accordingly, structures like a tool
shed, plastic arch shed, or gardener’s resting room will be tagged as “illegal construction”,
which greatly impacts SMRGs’ physical supporting conditions. For example, seedlings
may die, and the horticultural DIY classes have to be canceled in inclement weather.
SMRGs are also related to the business department for the license issue. The business
law stipulates that a business needs a physical address to be licensed, but the rooftop does
not have an address. If the FAR policy allows SMRGs to have a roofed structure, and
accordingly a formal address, then the garden businesses can apply for a license. As a
result, though catering businesses like garden cafés or garden teahouses are popular with
visitors, they become illegitimate when not licensed. According to one SMRG developer,
“We have an informal 200 m2 indoor space, yet we cannot use this space to apply for a
business license. Many visitors are interested in hosting company gatherings in our garden.
Yet they hesitate as they need to pay the cost to a formal company.” While some gardens
are operated as informal businesses, “We cannot advertise for our unlicensed garden café.
We are afraid of whistleblowers. Should it be a legitimate business, I am sure the garden
can self-sustain or even make a profit.” SMRG’s financial sustainability is thus greatly
impacted.
The third department that influences SMRG’s sustainability is the fire department. The
legitimacy problem further causes other management problems, including fire safety
regulation. For this new industry, the fire department cannot apply the regular fire
specification as SMRGs are not formally registered; but SMRGs, as a component of the
mall, still undergo fire inspection. According to a garden manager, “It is a gray area,
nobody says we are illegal, nobody says we are legal. We want to register our garden center
at the Fire Department, but they do not accept our application. During important city
events, the city’s fire inspector simply asks us to shut down to eliminate any potential safety
risks.” Given these FAR-related legitimacy and management problems, some SMRGs and
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businesses exist for only several years before the gardens are transferred to the next tenant
or just abandoned. For instance, the Vanke Garden Center, which was established in 2017
with 23 small flower shops established, as of 2019, only three shops survived.
2.4.2.3 The oversight gap
Due to the abovementioned financial and legitimacy gaps, some developers can avoid
the ban, driving the oversight problem. Though SMRGs are club goods, they are not
completely independent of government regulation or incentive. Most developers have
applied for and received either the direct subsidy or the in-lieu incentive; meanwhile, they
need to follow the 30%-green-roof regulation. In this regard, the government must monitor
the policy implementation outcome and make sure all the incentivized or regulated SMRGs
are well established and maintained. Generally, green roofs, compared with ground-level
green spaces, are scattered and less accessible, which poses considerable oversight
problems for the government with limited staff (Keeley et al., 2013).
First, although around 1/3 developers volunteered to establish SMRGs, others may
want to enjoy a green image without having to actually pay the costs of being
environmentally responsible (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). SMRG’s cross-sectoral nature
leaves loopholes in policy implementation. For instance, when negotiating the mall
developing plan with the district government, some developers may ask to reduce the
project’s 30% green roof establishment duty. Johns (2019) suggests that green
infrastructure’s implementation is always influenced by political or economic
considerations. Shopping malls, given their economic contribution and positive influences
on communities’ life, are regarded as both an economic and political achievement for the
located district (M. Li, 2017). District governments with relatively lower GDP tend to
accept such a green-roof reduction request to attract the mall to locate in their district. A
cross-departmental administrative system renders this compromise possible. For instance,
the greening regulation may be compromised when it is made by the greening department
but implemented by the planning department in the project approval process. A good
example is the mall of Yuexing Global Port, one of the largest malls in Shanghai. Both the
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municipal and district greening departments contacted the developer several times in the
hope of establishing a high-quality demonstration SMRG to serve as a green role model
for other malls. To their disappointment, the mall was finally completed with only a small
green roof, even though it publicized in the media its 30,000 m2 SMRG. The greening
officers were annoyed: “This mall project even fails to meet the ground-level greening
requirement. We do not understand why this project is even approved when it does not
meet the greening requirement. According to the in-lieu policy, they should construct more
roof greening as compensation.” In other cases, in order to encourage the mall to locate in
their district, the district’s high-level officers may ask the greening department to allocate
some subsidy, even if the roof garden area is not big enough to qualify for a subsidy. When
departments have incompatible interests and are not well coordinated, the SMRG may
become a compromise instead of a necessity.
Second, SMRG’s economic stringency directly leads to SMRGs’ degrading quality,
which impacts the garden’s ecological and social benefit provision. Developers tried to
minimize maintenance costs by decreasing the greening areas or using lots of plastic plants.
In the Let’sCreateMore SMRG, almost 90% were plastic plants. In the Macalline SMRG,
the on-site gardener complained: “The maintenance has been contracted out for many years
at a low price of 10 CNY/m2/year (Note: at the district-level, the maintenance quota is 12.7
CNY/m2/year). But this year, the manager plans to find a new maintenance company, as
the present maintenance cost remains a heavy burden for the mall.” Another way of saving
maintenance costs is to reduce opening hours or simply to close the garden when the
operation costs exceed the benefits. Many gardens have much shorter opening times than
the mall’s, such as 11:00-18:00. In the author’s field investigation, around 20% SMRGs
were either temporarily closed or never open for public use. This is echoed by comments
from the Dianping.com evaluation website; many customers complained about the
unexpected closure of the SMRGs. Of course, SMRG’s opening or not is completely at the
developer’s discretion. However, as a club good, when the SMRG is poorly maintained
and even closed to visitors, the expected benefits of increasing the customer base cannot
be realized.
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Finally, when regulations are inconsistent with the developers’ interests, they may
defend their interests by putting up an active and direct resistance or playing games with
the system (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008). This is the case in SMRG projects, where the
developer’s noncompliance with the regulation or the FAR policy is not uncommon. For
example, some developers actively invite equestrian clubs to locate in their SMRG, but
part of the established roof greening is removed and replaced with either sand or plastic
grass. Or, when the sheltering structure is not allowed, some developers find leeway to get
around the ban. They use the caravan or a refurbished container for necessary indoor
activities; such facilities are mobile and can function as an office but not allowed. Some
developers constructed temporary shelters. Such non-compliance adds to the urban
planning department’s inspection and oversight burden.

2.5 Discussion
The emergence of club goods represents a voluntary compensation of the under-supply
equilibrium of the provision of a public good (McNutt, 1999). However, when both the
policy design and implementation fail to sufficiently respond to the club good’s positive
externality and cross-sectoral nature, the club goods become unsustainable. On the one
hand, the policies are not able to internalize SMRG’s external benefits to recover the
production costs. The identified policy gaps are closely interrelated with the SMRG’s
financial stringency, which is exacerbated by the legitimacy gap. Both the financial and the
legitimacy gaps further cause the noncompliance as well as the oversight gap, and
undermined the quantity and quality of club goods. On the other hand, the departmentalism
did not resonate with SMRG’s cross-sectoral nature. Thus, club-good-friendly policies
have not formed yet and the policy implementation compromises the existing policy
effectiveness. Christopher Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing (2017) contend that in order to
improve execution success, policies need to be designed in a way that “connects actors
vertically and horizontally in a process of collaboration and joint deliberation” (P475). This
section will discuss how an appropriate institutional response, including coordinated policy
design and interdepartmental administration may address the above-identified gaps and
improve club-goods’ sustainability.
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2.5.1 Policy tool design to internalize club-good’s benefits
When a club good’s revenue is insufficient to cover the costs, the government can
design policies to monetize the good’s external benefits (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). For
SMRGs, some benefits such as the energy-saving can be automatically internalized when
the building’s energy bill decreases after green roof installation. However, other benefits
like air quality improvement, stormwater management, or urban biodiversity cannot be
easily evaluated and monetized (Claus & Rousseau, 2012). The stormwater tax and the
FAR incentive are two popular policy tools that can reduce a green roof developer’s
financial pressure.
2.5.1.1 The stormwater tax to internalize the stormwater management benefit
The effectiveness of a club approach depends on the government’s skillful policy
design (Peters, 2010). Optimized policy design by adding a stormwater tax to the existing
direct subsidy policy can ensure all club-good investors benefit from such a policy tool
mix. For shopping malls, usually, the roof owner is not always the garden developer, and
the SMRG may be taken over by different garden developers (Miller, 2014). The initial
garden developer receives the one-lump-sum subsidy, but when the garden business is not
promising, he may transfer the SMRG to the next developer or simply abandon it, and the
successors receive nothing. The added stormwater tax can encourage the successors to
maintain the SMRGs, too. So long as the SMRG is kept in good shape, its stormwater
management function will benefit the developer through the stormwater tax rebate. In the
long run, the saved stormwater tax would be very considerable (Carter & Fowler, 2008).
Of course, these saved stormwater tax rebates can also be converted to a water quota bonus.
As summer irrigation is a high maintenance cost, such a water quota bonus can relieve the
SMRG developer’s water bill burden. The greening department has been in negotiation
with the water department for identifying the potential of this policy. Of course, the
stormwater tax rebates can only partially cover the SMRG maintenance costs. Other
incentive policies like the FAR will indirectly help internalize the positive benefits.
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2.5.1.2 The FAR bonus to legitimize club goods
When the FAR becomes the key to solving SMRG’s legitimacy problem, the FAR
policy may be revised to allow n% of the total garden area to be legally roofed for gardenrelated use. In many countries, the FAR bonus is a widely-used indirect incentive for green
roof development (Carter & Fowler, 2008; Kayden, 2000). Yet, for SMRGs as club goods,
the FAR bonus allows developers to use the bonus roofed space to acquire the business
license. In Shanghai, there are a few cases of allowing the FAR bonus. For example, the
2012 Macalline (Beicai) SMRG was approved for a 10% FAR, which allows the business
to be legally licensed and to have a formal indoor space for operation. Compared with the
direct subsidy, this policy enables developers to support the club goods’ development.
According to one manager: “We prefer the FAR policy than the direct subsidy policy. The
FAR policy is like allowing us fishing; while the subsidy policy is like giving us some
fish.” The FAR bonus policy has the potential to turn both the government and the
developer’s inputs into meaningful outputs.
Legitimization indirectly allows developers to internalize SMRG’s ecological benefits
and create other positive public values. For instance, the Yangpu District Sci. & Tech.
Commission proposed to establish a Youth Education Center for Nature-Deficit Disorder
in one SMRG by granting annual funding. But this proposal is so far not realized as the
SMRG is not a formally registered organization. Once this legitimacy problem is solved,
the SMRG as a club good can provide valuable social services, because youth nature-deficit
disorder is a big social problem in cities (Beatley, 2010). Shopping malls are usually at the
hub of transportation with good public accessibility (Brunner, 2011). The location
advantage along with the provision of nature-related services will allow developers to
explore an appropriate club model. For instance, rooftop equestrian clubs have become
popular because parents do not have to spend hours on transportation to send the children
to remote suburban sites for equestrian instruction. Customers are willing to go to the
SMRG to enjoy nature-related activities with convenience. In this sense, the FAR policy
allows developers to create a kind of for-profit sustainability.
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2.5.1.3 The resultant benefits of reducing the oversight burden
Kayden (2000) suggests that when the private sector is engaged in providing public
goods, regulation is necessary to secure public service quality and operation. In a clubgood approach, Warner (2011) instead argues that the developer must maintain highquality services and infrastructure in order to internalize benefits to the club members;
otherwise, fee collection or charging will become less possible. In this sense, when the
SMRG business is legitimized and revenue increases, the developers will have improved
financial capacity and motivation to adequately maintain an appealing roof garden to attract
more customers, rather than to frequently close the garden to lower the maintenance costs.
Prakash and Potoski (2007) contend that club goods with positive externalities tend to be
underproduced and vice versa. In this research, if the SMRGs become profitable and well
maintained, the positive ecological and social externalities will increase; meanwhile, more
malls would like to follow suit, which implies that there will be more SMRGs established
in the future.
Such a desirable outcome will ultimately reduce the government’s quality oversight
responsibility. For instance, one interviewed officer suggests that, from her viewpoint,
government oversight is not even necessary as she believes “when developers are willing
to construct a garden, that means they either love SMRGs or at least they perceive SMRGs
positively. If finally, the garden is out of maintenance, it is very possibly because of the
funding shortage. Then, financial or policy support instead of oversight is more needed by
them.” Moreover, when SMRG’s FAR bonus is present, the government’s responsibility
for overseeing illegal construction will be minimized too. As when the business has
legitimate roofed spaces, developers need not take the risk by playing with the system and
using caravans, containers, or other restricted structures for indoor activities. Other
management problems like fire inspection will be automatically solved, too. Private
businesses are thus directed towards sustainable development (Steurer, 2013). However,
such a virtuous cycle is based on the premise of close interdepartmental collaboration
towards effective policy design and implementation.
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2.5.2 Collaborative administration to respond to SMRG’s cross-sectoral
nature
An enabling institutional environment entails not only to design policy tools that can
solve the problems but to integrate the stakeholders to find sufficient common ground to
advance the policy-making and implementation process (Christopher Ansell et al., 2017).
This is especially important for club goods like SMRGs which suffer from a cross-sector
nature. As is obvious, all the policies including the stormwater tax, the water quota policy,
or the FAR bonus policy will require inter-departmental collaboration. Much like the
public-private collaboration, where cross-sectoral interest conflict is not uncommon, crossdepartmental collaboration involves interest conflicts, too (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008). A
potential solution is to identify and represent all stakeholders’ interests in order to break
administrative silos and boost voluntary participation in municipal governance
opportunities (Fung, 2004).
The achievement of such interest representation requires the advocacy party’s efforts.
In a multi-department policy network, not only leadership but also the interest priority and
power relationships will influence the green policy adoption (Johns, 2019). The greening
department has always been eager to promote more SMRGs, which is usually a small part
of a huge mall development project and not necessarily the interests or political priority of
other departments. Hence, the greening department must act as a knowledge broker to
market the SMRG’s deep values, and to build alliances with new partners. Koppenjan
(2015) suggests that advocates always need to frame an issue in a bigger framework and to
represent the relevant party’s interests in collaborations. For the moment, green roof
establishment is justified mainly as increasing recreational green space for citizens. That is
not enough. For instance, to convince the water department to support the legislation of a
stormwater tax, the greening department needs to explain SMRG’s benefits in stormwater
runoff reduction and storm peak flow delay. In many countries, green roofs are encouraged
mainly for the urban stormwater management function, which is especially important in
populous urban centers (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In most Chinese cities, urban flooding is
becoming an increasingly severe environmental problem. Thus, the green roof’s
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stormwater management function, which has been largely downplayed, would be a good
selling point to obtain the water department’s collaboration.
In a similar vein, the greening department may advise or guide developers to fit SMRGs
into the planning department’s agenda. According to some interviewees, the FAR bonus
policy has been frequently proposed by the greening department but not supported by the
planning department because the latter worries that the policy may ultimately lead to far
more illegal construction and exacerbate the oversight problem, which, of course, is not
necessarily the case as previously discussed. From the planning department’s perspective,
they perceive that the bonus policy will bring only burdens rather than benefits to them.
Such a negative perception may be compensated through a multi-product approach, which
means SMRGs can produce both club-goods and pure public goods, shared by both club
members and cities (McNutt, 1999). The club-good approach is usually criticized for
preventing an equal distribution of the club goods by catering to only a specific group’s
interests (Warner, 2011). A multi-product approach can compensate for this disadvantage.
For instance, the planning department is now dedicated to a “15-minute living circle”
community revitalization plan as part of the municipal urban planning (2016-2040), which
means citizens can reach the basic living services and public spaces within a 15-minute
walking distance (M. Li, 2017). Shopping malls as important hubs of city life are
unquestionably included in this plan, yet the rooftop is always a forgotten space. SMRG’s
multi-product clubs will be able to contribute to this community revitalization plan by
making the SMRGs more user-friendly. Responding to SMRG users’ evaluations from the
Dianping.com website, the improvement measures may include adding more amenities for
children, extending the garden opening hours, better designing the rooftop flue pipes to
minimize the greasy smell, arranging an elevator that can directly reach the garden, or
organizing community activities like open-air movies. There are now several malls that
established outdoor stairs to make the SMRG accessible beyond the mall business hours;
other malls can be encouraged to do so, too. These adjustments will not only improve
customer satisfaction and customer base but will also meet the planning department’s
interests, and thus will be more motivated to provide necessary support for SMRGs.
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2.6 Conclusions
Urban green space provision in high-density metropolises is a big challenge for
governments when land resources are in severe shortage. The club-good approach to
producing SMRGs presents some potential. However, existing green roof policies, though
benefiting SMRG’s establishment, are insufficient for their long-term sustainability as
these policies fail to internalize the club good’s positive externalities and respond to their
cross-sector nature. Without sufficient policy support, there are financial and legitimacy
gaps, and the resultant club good’s degraded quality and developer’s noncompliance
further cause an oversight gap for the government. Moreover, SMRG’s cross-sectoral
nature requires multi-department collaborative administration in the policymaking and
implementation process. For the moment, when the pioneering 1/3 malls have established
roof gardens but are struggling with the sustainability problem, while other 2/3 malls have
not taken action yet, it is important to provide a timely institutional response. Such
responses include (1) optimized policy design to internalize SMRG’s external benefits in
order to financially sustain and legalize the club goods, and ensure their quality to reduce
oversight responsibility; (2) to build cross-departmental allies and boost voluntary
participation in municipal governance opportunities through interest representation. Both
contribute to a club-good enabling institutional environment. However, this research is
constrained by the nascency of the SMRG industry and based on the authors’ single-city
investigation. This recommends future research to explore the feasibility of a club-good
approach to mitigating the urban green space shortage problem, and to conduct more
empirical examinations of the importance of an enabling institutional environment for this
for-profit sustainability initiative.
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2014

2017
2017
2013
2016
2016
2007
2018

Multi-media Life
Plaza

Hongqiao The Place

Arch Shanghai

Vanke (Qibao)

The MixC (Wuzhong)

Aegen Place
(Shanghai)

Yuexing (Global Port)

Yuexing Furniture
Mall

Ruihong Tiandi Moon
Bay

Xingyou City

Joy City (Change
Feng)

Raffles (Changning)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

2017

2017

2014

2016

2014

K11

Year of
establishment

1

Mall name

Appendix

1,200

9,850

2,500

282

1,200

3,260

4,000

5,000

8,000

7,600

5,800

1,483

300

SMRG
area
(m2)

Inner

Middle

Inner

Inner

Inner

Inner

Middle

Middle

Outer

Middle

Middle

Inner

Inner

Location

Good

Plastic plants

N/A

Good

Restaurant

Sports

No

No

Restaurant

Equestrian

Insufficient
maintenance
low vegetation rate

Y

Equestrian,
café, urban
farm

Good

Y

Y

No

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Mini zoo/
urban farm
Garden center

Y

Urban farm

No

Y

Evaluated
on
Dianping.
com (Y/N)

Restaurant

Plastic plants

Almost abandoned

Good

Good

No

Café

Insufficient
maintenance
Insufficient
maintenance

SMRG
business

Sustainability of
SMRGs

Table 2.3 SMRGs surveyed in Shanghai

Not for
public

Closed

Open (Y/N)

1

0

0

0

1

1

2

0

1

2

1

0

0

Developer
Manager
gardener

1

0

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

0

1

Visitor

Interviewed
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2019
2016

Starlight (Zhenru)

Westlink

Bailian (Expo Axis)

Bailian (Zhonghuan)

Bailian (Wujiaochang)

Bailian (Century
Avenue)

Sh-Centurylink

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2014
2016

2018
2017

Macalline (Zhenbei)

Macalline (Beicai)

Macalline (Pujiang)

Macalline (Jincang
Rd.)

Printemps (Tangqiao)

Capitaland (LuOne's)

Capitaland (Qibao)

LCM

Shanghai Magnolia
Plaza

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

2016

N/A

2019

2012

2017

Zendai Big Thumb
Plaza

23

2005

2018

2007

2014

2017

2018

2014

MTR City Plaza

15

2017

TaiKoo Hui

14

12,150

7,000

12,000

N/A

1,400

9,058

17,300

8,000

4,668

1,100

1,000

3,000

900

9,200

6,000

4,600

5,372

2,840

4,446

Inner

Inner

Outer

Inner

Inner

Middle

Outer

Middle

Middle

Middle

Inner

Inner

Middle

Middle

Middle

Outer

Middle

Middle

Inner

Equestrian

Insufficient
maintenance

Good

Plastic plants

Good

N/A

Good

Insufficient
maintenance

Good

Good

Good

Insufficient
maintenance

low maintenance

Good

Club events

Y

Y

Y

Equestrian;
playground
Playground

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

No

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Not for
public

Closed

Closed

Not for
public

No
Y

Not for
public

No

Y

Restaurant

Urban farm

Equestrian

No

Garden center

Urban farm

Football

No

No

No

Equestrian

Insufficient
maintenance

Plastic lawn

Equestrian

Basketball

Basketball

Fairs/shows

low vegetation rate

N/A

N/A

low vegetation rate

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

4

1

1

1

0

2

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

2

2

2

0

1
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2018
2013

2009
2015

Greenland Being
Funny (Huangpu)

International
Financial Center (IFC
Mall)

Skymall (Minhang)

Hopson One
(Wujiaochang)

Life Hub (Jinqiao)

Sheng Park

35

36

37

38

39

40

1,500

Average
4,913 m2

2018
10% prior
2010 (4)
30% 201115 (12)
57.5% 201619 (23)

600

1,600

4,000

8,000

200

13,000

2,193

40% Inner
(16)
47.5%
Middle (19)
12.5%
Outer (5)

Middle

Middle

Middle

Outer

Inner

Inner

Middle

Middle

40% are sustainable
(16)

Good

Abandoned

low vegetation rate

Abandoned

Good

Insufficient
maintenance

Good

Good

77.5% forprofit (31)

Urban farm

Urban farm

87.5%
evaluated
(28)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Mini zoo；
Urban farm
Club events

Y

Y

Y

Y

No

Urban farm

Equestrian

No

20% closed
that day or
never open
to the public
(8)

Closed

42

2

2

1

1

2

1

1

0

28

1

0

1

0

0

0

2

2

Note: Location: “Inner” means the mall is within the city’s inner ring road on the city map; Outer means outside the outer ring road;
Middle is in between the two rings. Source: by author.

Sum-up

2017

Greenland Being Fun
(Xuhui)

34

2014

2013

Touch Mall（Xuhui）
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Abstract
Originating in neoliberal democracies, the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a common
policy tool allowing governments to provide public service through collaboration. In some
non-liberal societies, PPPs may not squarely fit into the classic PPP category but rather
take different forms, which we label as ‘Quasi-PPPs’ (QPPPs). QPPPs provide important
functions especially in economies in transition, yet have received little academic attention.
Here we propose a general definition of QPPPs as ‘partnerships between a government
entity and a not-fully private entity’, and explore factors that influence the PPP-QPPP
transition in non-liberal contexts, using the nascent Chinese eco-environmental service
partnerships for a case analysis. Drawing on insights from a self-established dataset and
interviews, we find that the PPP-QPPP transition involved two-steps: (1) the ecoenvironmental service partnerships, initially established as PPPs, became inoperable with
inexperienced partners and unsupportive markets; (2) with state bailout, the private partner
became a subordinated partner in an ‘SOE-private consortium’, and PPPs transitioned to
QPPPs. QPPPs brought about two outcomes: hidden debts for the government and the
private sector’s nationalization. We conclude that in a non-liberal society, when three
critical PPP assumptions, namely competent partners, supportive market, and horizontal
structure, are violated, PPPs are more likely to transition to QPPPs.
Keywords: PPP; Quasi-PPP; eco-environment service; China
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3.1 Introduction
Governments all over the world are using partnership arrangements to shift or share the
costs and risks in providing public goods and services (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).
One popular arrangement is the Public-Private Partnership (PPP). PPP is defined as a
‘cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character in which actors
develop mutual products and/or services and in which risk, costs, and benefits are shared.’
(Klijn & Teisman, 2003, p. 2). PPPs have well-recognized features including long-term
contracts, private engagement, and major investments from the private sector (Hodge &
Greve, 2007). New Public Management proponents have argued that PPPs increase
governments’ problem-solving capacity, assuming that the private sector can provide costefficient and reliable services for the same or better quality standards and price (Rakić &
Rađenović, 2011). For instance, private partners may have the ability to maximize value
for money and thus deliver outcomes at a lower cost through PPPs (Andrews & Entwistle,
2010).
Besides PPPs, there are other extensively used yet less-noticed partnerships that do not
squarely fall into the classic PPP category, which are labeled as Quasi-PPPs (QPPPs).
QPPPs have emerged in service-provision sectors, i.e. health and medicine, education, and
energy (Zapata & Hall, 2012), and often in countries with a dominant public sector, such
as Russia (Nikitenko, Goosen, & Sablin, 2016), Poland (Tasan-Kok & Zaleczna, 2010),
the Middle East (Burbury, 2017), and China. Nikitenko et al. (2016) defined QPPPs in
terms of the proportion of public investment and the contract term. They note that Russian
QPPP projects feature a high percentage of state investment, which can be over 50%, with
shortened contract terms running less than three years on average. In Poland, QPPP
initiatives refer to those project partnerships that do not fall under PPP as defined by the
legislature but are partnerships in terms of organization and objectives (Tasan-Kok &
Zaleczna, 2010). Zapata and Hall (2012) distinguished quasi-public versus quasi-private
PPPs. Both are funded mainly by the public sector, but quasi-public are QPPPs
characterized by high participation of actors from the private sector and civil society, while
quasi-private QPPPs are managed by the private sector. The common thread throughout
62

these cases is the use of ‘quasi’ to indicate a deviation in the characteristics of one of the
partners or the partner relationship itself. These deviations may lead to distinctive
outcomes. For example, in Russia, QPPP projects greatly outnumber PPP projects, and the
prominence of QPPPs has essentially blocked PPP development; private investment
accounts for only 0.89% of total Russian GDP (Nikitenko et al., 2016).
Synthesizing across these limited studies, we propose a formal definition of QPPP as a
partnership between a government entity and a not-fully private entity, characterized by
one or more of the following features: shorter contract periods, predominant funding from
the public sector, with costs and benefits not always equally shared between partners. The
rarity of QPPPs in the literature may be due to their unique role in countries with centralized
governments or a dominant public sector, particularly in communist or former communist
states.
In China, the concept of providing public services through partnerships began in the
1980s and experienced three waves (Zhang, Gao, Feng, & Sun, 2015). Through the waves,
the government’s main partners shifted from foreign investors in the 1990s to SOEs in the
2000s, and domestic private enterprises in the third wave beginning in 2014 (Tan & Zhao,
2019). Before 2014, partnerships developed at a negligible scale and were largely limited
to the provision of infrastructure and utilities. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
play substantial roles in these partnerships. Although in China most people use the term
‘PPP’ referring to partnerships between the government and SOEs (Tan & Zhao, 2019;
Xiong, Chen, Wang, & Zhu, 2019), others have questioned the nature of Chinese PPPs.
For instance, Adams, Young, and Zhihong (2006) suggested that Chinese-style PPPs are
qualitatively different, embedded in a system based on public ownership that alters the
relationship between the public and private sectors. Some scholars use Public-EnterprisePartnerships (Zhang et al., 2015) or Public-Public-Partnerships (Braadbaart, Zhang, &
Wang, 2009; Mu, De Jong, & Koppenjan, 2011) when referring to Chinese partnerships.
Economically, Chinese partnerships were suboptimal as they did not provide services
at a lowered cost (Mu et al., 2011). In the third-wave initiative, the central government
attempted to establish ‘real PPPs’ by ‘following the international PPP practice’ to realize
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the benefits associated with PPPs (Lavanchy, 2018, p. 11). The Chinese government
encouraged the public sector to collaborate with ‘Enterprise Capitals’, which includes both
state-owned and private enterprises (Tan & Zhao, 2019). This research will examine the
eco-environmental service partnerships in the third-wave initiative, which as initially
established between the government and private non-SOEs were real PPPs. These PPPs
became infeasible and gradually transitioned into government ‘SOE-private-consortium’
partnerships, namely QPPPs. This paper will explore the factors that influence such a PPPQPPP transition. Given the challenges of establishing real PPPs in China, it is of great
importance to understand why partnerships in China fail to develop into real PPPs, but
instead, evolve into QPPPs.

3.2 Features of Chinese QPPPs
Generally, a Chinese QPPP can be defined as a ‘partnership between a government and
an SOE-involved not-fully private partner.’ In China, there lacks a clear demarcation
between the public and private sectors (Zhang et al., 2015). The context for Chinese QPPP
is characterized by several historic economic and political factors that benefit SOEs and
corporatized public entities. This results in an over-dominance of SOEs and an
underrepresented private sector, and often results in economic under-performance of the
partnership’s programs and activities.
In Chinese QPPPs, SOEs often have governmental connections and monopolistic
behaviors, and thus have inherent advantages when dealing with government-related
business. SOEs may also have greater capacities in technology and management
experience than private companies, and a more appropriate organizational size to handle
large-scale municipal projects (Cheng, Ke, Lin, Yang, & Cai, 2016). Before the 1980s,
almost all transportation projects were assigned to SOEs for design, construction,
operation, and management (Mu et al., 2011). Moreover, SOEs have a more robust
financing capacity, which is a key success factor for PPP investment in public
infrastructure (Cheung, Chan, & Kajewski, 2012). PPPs often require higher financing
costs from the private partner compared with other financing approaches. Given the SOEs’
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governmental connections, they have a more favorable lending status with state-owned
banks (Cheng et al., 2016). Wei and Wang (1997) found that even though roughly onethird of SOEs were in substantial debt, few went bankrupt as state-owned banks provided
generous loans to keep SOEs afloat. This reduces the risk of bankruptcies that would
normally terminate PPP contracts.
As in Russia, Chinese QPPPs are notable for reduced partnership opportunities for the
private sector given the SOEs’ predominance. In a public-dominant society, the
relationship between the public and private sectors is delicate. From the public side, some
private companies’ opportunistic or deviant behaviors reduce their credibility and
reliability, and increase risks to all partners. Mu et al. (2011) suggested that projects granted
to private contractors were sometimes abandoned and eventually transferred to SOEs for
completion, or otherwise did not meet expectations. Reliability issues and risk aversion for
municipal infrastructure projects deter the government from future partnerships with the
private sector. From the private side, the lack of a system for recognizable private property
rights is not yet in place, and this lack increases the uncertainty of asset ownership in
private companies. This uncertainly imposes a serious constraint on the willingness of
private companies to be involved in partnerships (Adams et al., 2006).
Finally, Chinese QPPPs typically demonstrate suboptimal economic performance
when SOEs operate in a more bureaucratic and less-businesslike way despite (or partially
because of) the above-mentioned intrinsic advantages benefiting SOEs. A PPP’s costeffectiveness is highly dependent upon the private sector’s businesslike operations
(Cheung et al. (2012). In Chinese QPPPs, SOEs are the major partner. Their semibureaucratic operating system is often overstaffed and values outputs such as social
benefits over efficiency and profitability (Holz, 2002). Furthermore, QPPP project bidding
may not always follow the best value-for-money principle. When SOEs are the
government’s first-choice partner, projects with no real-risk transfer and limited (or no)
life-cycle obligations tend to be awarded to local SOEs, not necessarily in a competitive
procedure (Lavanchy, 2018). More critically, when SOEs have easy access to cheaper
financing, they often accept lower returns for QPPP projects (Bloomberg News, 2017),
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undermining the prioritization of economic performance. For these reasons, in the thirdwave initiative, the central government had strongly encouraged the private sector’s
engagement to emphasize the desirability of economic efficiency (Lavanchy, 2018, p. 11).

3.3 Methodology
The PPP concept is rooted in neo-liberal democracies and highly dependent on some
context-specific assumptions (Linder, 1999). If critical assumptions are not satisfied, the
probability of adverse consequences may increase, such as forced renegotiations of the
contract, the bailout of the private sector, or termination of PPPs (Vecchi, Hellowell, Della
Croce, & Gatti, 2017). Although a PPP’s viability relates to many legal, economic,
technological factors (Cheung et al., 2012; Jamali, 2004; Zhang et al., 2015), we do not
intend to enumerate these factors here. However, as QPPPs happen largely in non-liberal
contexts, we focus on context-specific factors. Combining insights from an elaborated
study of the literature and a preliminary study of the third-wave partnership practice, we
suppose (1) the competent partners and (2) market support may directly relate to the
viability of PPPs, and (3) the partner’s structure may influence the redirection of inoperable
PPPs.
3.3.1 Three context-specific assumptions of PPP
First, a viable PPP assumes the availability of competent partners, including a skilled
government to package PPP projects and experienced and reliable private partners to
execute projects (Ng, Wong, & Wong, 2010). The government’s capabilities may include
maintaining a stable political and social environment, establishing a transparent and sound
regulatory framework, or allocating and managing risk. The private partner’s capabilities
include businesslike practices and thinking, the business acumen of profit-making, the
ability to evaluate and avoid financial risk, and/or the ability to secure private capital
(Jamali, 2004). A partner’s lack of experience may lead to many problems including cost
overruns, revenue deficiency, and construction schedule delays, which can result in early
termination of PPP projects (Song, Hu, & Feng, 2018).
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Second, a PPP’s viability entails effective market-based policy-tools to help private
investors attain the necessary capital and revenue. Policy tools for capital acquisition in a
developed market economy may include direct provision of debt and equity or capital
credit-enhancement tools. Infrastructure PPPs usually have strong and long-term investors
such as pension funds, life insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds (Gatti, 2014).
These investors are attracted to the long maturities and stable returns associated with
infrastructure-related financial securities. As for revenue, for PPP projects like
transportation or utilities, the PPP investors are paid back by collecting tolls or utility fees
from users. For non-revenue-generating services, including environmental services,
policy-tool design to monetize the service becomes indispensable. In the US, urban
stormwater-management PPP projects are funded through property taxes, in-lieu fees, and
banking & offset programs (USEPA, 2015). For example, in Washington D.C., stormwater
tradable credits are generated by flood-mitigation installations like rain gardens and green
roofs that can be exchanged for development permits (The Nature Conservancy, 2016).
Third, a PPP also assumes a horizontal rather than hierarchical structure, with roughly
equivalent power and authority sharing between the public and private entities. The
equality of PPP partners lies in not only cost and risk sharing, but in service-delivery design
and decision making, including veto power (Rakić & Rađenović, 2011). Inequality
between partners can diminish the benefits of a PPP and alter the overall PPP development
trajectory. Public-sector dominance can reduce the ability of the private actor to make costefficient decisions, while the dominance of private sector interests diminishes the benefits
to the state actor (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). The overdominance by private
partners may also lead to privatization, which represents a shift of power and responsibility
from public to private actors and an ownership transfer from the public towards the private
sector (Linder, 1999). Some even argue that PPPs are equivalent to privatization, which
‘reinforces the view that the government cannot be expected to perform well’ (Savas
(2000).
3.3.2 Case selection and data collection
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Data on the central government’s post-2014 PPP initiative were acquired from the
official database of China’s ‘Public-Enterprise-Capital Partnership Center’ under the
Ministry of Finance (www.cpppc.org). This research centers on projects in the
environmental services sector, which includes renewable energy, flood mitigation, air and
water pollution mitigation, and ecosystem restoration. We focused on environmental
service QPPPs for two reasons. First, while environmental protection QPPP projects
accounted for only 0.5% of the total number of QPPP projects before 2013 (Cheng et al.,
2016), this sector became the third-largest category (9.82%) by 2014, following public
utilities and transportation (Table 3.1), thus representing a rapid rise in the popularity of
the sector. Second, compared with other sectors, environment-protection projects usually
have a lower investment cost and have thus attracted more private engagement from small
and medium-sized enterprises, offering a larger and more diverse pool of projects to
examine (Lavanchy, 2018). Within this pool, we chose the subset of ‘ecosystem
restoration’ or ‘eco-environment’ projects that were more tightly linked to urban green
space construction and restoration to create a set of cases that would be comparable.
Table 3.1 Categories of Chinese QPPP projects
Categories of PPPs

Number of Projects

Percentage

1

Municipal engineering

3620

39.76%

2

Transport

1291

14.18%

3

Ecological/Environment protection

894

9.82%

4

Town development

583

6.40%

5

Education

430

4.72%

6

Hydraulic construction

380

4.17%

7

Tourism

319

3.50%

8

Healthcare

263

2.89%

9

Infrastructure

198

2.17%

10

Culture

194

2.13%
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11

Guaranteed housing

154

1.69%

12

Science and Technology

131

1.44%

13

Energy

119

1.31%

14

Sports

118

1.30%

15

Eldercare

104

1.14%

16

Agriculture

76

0.83%

17

Forestry

57

0.63%

18

Social security

35

0.38%

19

Others

138

1.52%

Total

9,104

100%

Source: Data from MOF Public-Enterprise Capital-Partnership database, as of Jul. 31,
2019.
Note: ‘Environment protection’ refers to the whole environment sector, including the
subset of ‘Eco-environment’.
To start, we identified the major eco-environment private partners, most of which are
listed companies. Non-listed companies represented a very small share of partnerships and
thus were not the focus of our analysis. As the main partner, listed companies are required
by law to release business and financial information, which makes partnership data easier
to acquire. We used the Chinese stock trading software of ZhiyuanYihutong developed by
the China Merchants Securities Co., Ltd., to collate the private companies listed under the
section of ‘Landscape’ and ‘Eco-environment’ (26 listed companies in total as of May
2019). To validate, we also examined the stock-exchange section of the professional
landscape website www.yuanlin.com, which showed 30 listed landscape companies. These
two sources were pooled to form a 45-company database, which includes both SOEs and
private enterprises. We then looked at all the 45 companies’ official websites and annual
reports since 2014 and identified 21 private, non-SOE companies with their main business
revenue from eco-environment or related fields as a set of QPPP cases.
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In data collection (Table 3.2), we focused on whether Chinese partnerships violated or
met our three PPP assumptions; if one or more assumptions were violated, we determined
how the violation of assumptions affected project or partnership outcomes. More
descriptions about the evaluation of each assumption are presented in Appendix 2. To
collect information for our assumptions, we used listed companies’ official websites and
reports, financial market websites such as www.eastmoney.com, and governmental
websites. We recorded the private company’s qualification-strengthening efforts including
IPO and rebranding (merging and renaming) and the company’s financial situation
(Assumption 1); market-based financial products (Assumption 2); and buyout/bailouts, and
ownership of the original private (non-SOE) companies (Assumption 3).
Table 3.2 PPP assumptions and evaluations
Assumptions

Evaluation

Partner competence

Market support

Horizontal structure

-Conception/

-Availability of market-

-Ownership (the

expectation of PPP

based policy tools to

controlling shareholder)

-Experience with PPP
-Risk perception and
aversion

monetize eco-service
-Financial products in
the market

-Independence of the
private
-Buyout/bailout

Data to test the assumptions were not always available through second-hand data
sources. For instance, detailed information on Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)’s business
models was difficult to obtain. For some projects with perceived profits such as sewage
treatment charges, there were only vague clauses in the contract. We then used snowball
sampling to interview 12 key informants from seven listed companies, three unlisted
companies that engaged or attempted to engage in partnerships, as well as two industry
associations. Interview questions complemented and validated online information and
filled the gaps in the secondary data. Our questions elicited information on all three
assumptions, including the partner’s understanding of and experiences with PPPs; the
availability of market-based policies and financing products; companies’ relationship with
the local government and the challenges associated with the private identity; the company’s
financial situation and project profitability; and SOE investment in the private companies
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and the impact of such investment. The basis of our argument was formed from interview
responses, the documentary evidence, and themes developed from coding.

3.4 Eco-environment partnerships and the private partner
3.4.1 Eco-environment partnerships
Rapid urbanization in recent decades has brought about substantial rural-to-urban
population migration and boosted the real estate market, which has become a significant
contributor to Chinese GDP growth (Fung, Jeng, & Liu, 2010). Up to 50-60% of local
government revenue currently depends on two sources: (1) land conveyance fees from the
gap between the lower cost of land acquisition from peasants and higher leasing prices to
developers/enterprises; (2) taxes from enterprises and property marketing (Tao, Su, Liu, &
Cao, 2010). The real-estate market has stimulated many industries, including landscape
architecture, with about 90% of its business closely tied to the real estate industry. At the
time of the third-wave initiative, over 16,000 landscape companies were established
nationwide (Peng, 2016). Most of these companies were small- to medium-sized private
firms, with fewer SOEs. Given the capital-intensive nature of landscape projects, larger
companies entered the capital market via initial public offering (IPO) and became listed
(Table 3.3). Among the eight early-listed companies, with the exception of two Special
Treatment companies (Ecobeauty and Yunnan), the other six, Orient Landscape &
Environment (OLE), Palm, Techand, Meichen, Mengcao, and Pubang, became pioneers in
the third-wave competitions.
Urbanization has resulted in severe environmental problems along with skyrocketing
housing prices. The central government regulated the real-estate market against speculation
and simultaneously called for ‘Beautiful China’ development by emphasizing ecological
and environmental protection. These paired policies placed local governments under
financial pressure. Post-boom declines in the real-estate market shrank local revenue, while
the Beautiful China initiative demanded expenditures on environmental protection
measures that increased construction costs. These were conditions under which the third71

wave PPP initiative was launched. Local governments responded to the central initiative
by organizing a myriad of training and field surveys, selecting pilot projects, and
establishing a PPP center (Huo, 2014).
This third-wave initiative has represented new opportunities for industries impacted by
the real-estate market downturn, including the landscape industry. The ‘Beautiful China’
initiative involves many areas related to the landscape industry: theme park planning, water
treatment, soil restoration, and large green infrastructure construction. It is noteworthy that
most eco-environmental projects are not typically revenue-generating, and previous to the
PPP initiative were completed using a short-term build-transfer approach. Now in the form
of a partnership, the contract period includes 3-5 years of construction plus 10-30 years of
operation/maintenance. Given that these projects have very limited revenue-generating
potential during the operation/ maintenance stage, usually, the government pays both
construction and maintenance costs for these partnership projects.
The landscape companies envisioned these partnerships as an opportunity to break the
state monopoly on public goods/services provision. For instance, OLE’s 2015 annual
report stated that ‘PPP opens the door for the private companies to engage in public
goods/services like water and park service, and broadens the development room of private
companies’ (P10). The president of the Techand company stated his resolution in a 2017
meeting: ‘(except for SOEs), private enterprises can also perform well in PPPs’. These
companies, owned and controlled by domestic private individuals (non-SOE companies),
became the main private partners in eco-environment partnerships.
3.4.2 Private partner qualifications
Given their previous underrepresentation in PPPs, landscape companies modified their
credibility, financial capacity, and branding to position themselves as eligible partners.
Credibility and financial capacity are two basic requirements for private partners. Cheng
et al. (2016) suggested that local governments prefer private investors with sufficient
competence and a higher degree of information disclosure as partners. Although SOEs are
perceived as a more reliable partner, they are minor actors in the landscape industry, which
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provided private enterprises room to develop in the environmental services sector. From
the perspective of our interviewees, the level of transparency associated with listed
companies is now regarded as a precondition for credibility by many governments. These
public listings also allowed for companies to expand their financial capacity. Before 2014,
there were only eight listed companies; during 2015-2017, 13 more became listed (Table
3.3). Those already listed (except two special treatment companies) had substantial firstcome advantages.
Branding is an equally important strategy for entering PPPs. The companies rebranded
through merger and renaming to facilitate PPP-project bidding. For example, companies
expanded their business from a narrow focus on landscaping design to services such as
water treatment and waste disposal. Much of this adjustment was accomplished through an
enterprise merger. Of the 21 listed landscape companies, 17 were involved in mergers and
acquisitions and the largest companies expanded dramatically (Table 3.3). For instance,
during 2015-2016, OLE merged with five environmental companies at the cost of fivefold
of its net profits (Lei, 2018). Sixteen out of these 21 companies took on new names to
appear more comprehensive and align with nationwide opportunities (Table 3.3). The term
‘landscape’ was regarded as too narrow and was replaced by ‘ecology’ ‘environment’, or
‘eco-environment’, and terms indicating the company’s locality were removed to appear
more national. This process of mergers and rebranding helped the companies sign more
trans-industry and trans-regional PPP contracts, boosting the number of eco-environmental
partnerships nationwide.
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1995*

2007

2009

2010

2011

2011

2012

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

IPO

ST* Shenzhen Ecobeauty
Co., Ltd.
ST* Yunnan Investment
Eco-Environment Sci
&Tech Co., Ltd.
Beijing Orient Landscape
& Environment Co., Ltd.

Palm Eco-town
Development Co., Ltd.

No

Shandong Meichen
Ecology& Environment Co.,
Ltd
Pubang Holdings Co., Ltd.

Yunnan Greenland
Biological
Technology Co.,
Ltd.

Beijing Orient
Landscape &
Ecology Co., Ltd.

Palm Landscape
Architecture Co.,
Ltd.

Techand Ecology
& Environment
Co., Ltd.

Shandong Meichen
Sci. & Tech. Co.,
Ltd.

Pubang Landscape
Architecture Co.,

Rename and Year

Beijing
Shenhuaxin Co.,
Ltd.

Old Name

Name of the company

2016

2017

2016

2016

2014

2016

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mer
ger

3.96

6.34

5.61

5.54

9.28

1.04

1.50

Market
value
Bn.
CNY
2018

Nov.
2018
N/A

Shandong State-owned Assets
Holdings Co., Ltd.

Apr.
2020

China Energy Conservation
&Enviro. Protection Group
State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission
of Shandong Province

Dec.
2018

Apr.
2019

Nov.
2018

Nov.
2011

Shenzhen Investment Holdings

Nanjing Qixia Construction Co.,
Ltd.

Yuzi Guaranteed-Housing
Management Co., Ltd. Henan
Prov.

State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission
of Chaoyang District, Beijing

Yunnan Investment Holding
Group Co., Ltd.

No

State-controlled shareholder
& year of involvement

Table 3.3 The private sector’s self-preparation for eco-environment QPPPs

Yes

Yes

1.42%

21.46%-Yes

>20%

10%

11.87
%

23.88
%

10% -Yes

19.86% -Yes

State is the
controlling
shareholder
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2016

2016

2017

2017

14

15

16

2015

11

13

2015

10

2015

2014

9

12

2012

8

Flower King EcoEngineering Inc.
No
Daqian
Ecology&Environment
Group Co., Ltd.
TianYu Eco-construction
Co., Ltd.

Wuhan Nusun
Environment Co.,
Ltd.

Daqian Ecology
and Landscape Co.,
Ltd.

Tianyu Ecology &
Landscape Co.,
Ltd.

Misho Ecology&Landscape
Co., Ltd.

Jiangsu Misho
Ecology&
Landscape Co.,
Ltd.

Jiangsu Flower
King Horticulture
Co., Ltd.

No

Shenzhen Wenke
Landscape Co.,
Ltd.

No

Linnan Eco-cultural
Tourism Co., Ltd.

Linnan Landscape
Co., Ltd.

Beijing Qianjing
Landscape Co.,
Ltd.

Inner Mongolia MengCao
Eco-constructional (Group)
Holdings Co., Ltd.

Inner Mongolia
MengCao Drought
Resistance
Holdings Co., Ltd.

Ltd.

2017

2018

2017

2016

2018

2016

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

1.07

1.07

1.11

1.67

2.11

4.56

2.82

5.05

5.36

No

No

No

No

Shanxi Water Group

Xiangjiang Zhongying Fund

Dec.
2019

Jul.
2019

Dec.
2018

Nov.
2018

State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission
of Guangxi
Shenzhen Investment Holdings

Jan.
2019

State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission
of Inner Mongolia

Central Huijin Asset
Management Co., Ltd.

13.95%-Yes

9.68%-2nd
largest

N/A

N/A

5.59%

1.41%
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Jiangsu Dongzhu
Landscape Co.,
Ltd.
Dongzhu Eco-construction
Protection Co., Ltd.
2018

2018

Tianjin Loving
Landscape&Ecology
Construction Co., Ltd.
Changed the belonging
industry from ‘Landscape’
to ‘Ecological protection
and Environmental
treatment’.

2014

Chengbang Ecoconstruction Co., Ltd.

Zhejiang
Chengbang
Landscape Co.,
Ltd.

Tianjin Loving
Landscape
Engineering Co.,
Ltd.

2018

No

Hangzhou
Landscape
Architecture
Design Institute
Co., Ltd.

2018

Yuancheng Environment
Co., Ltd

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

2.63

1.02

0.85

0.68

0.96

No

No

No

No

No

Note: * Shenhuaxin was a textile company and listed since 1995. In 2016, it completely transitioned to the eco-construction
industry.
The entries in italic are companies either not involved in renaming, merging, or state-investment.

2017

21

2017

19

2017

2017

18

20

2017

17

Zhejiang
Yuancheng
Landscape Group
Co., Ltd.

3.5 Applying PPP assumptions to eco-environment partnerships
Using our previously stated definitions and assumptions of PPPs and QPPPs, we
examined Chinese eco-environmental partnerships between the government and the private
listed companies. Here we determine whether these partnerships meet the three critical PPP
assumptions and if not, how the violation of assumptions affects project and partnership
outcomes.
Assumption 1: Competent partners
The partners’ experience or capability greatly influences their perception of PPP
opportunities and evaluation of the associated risks, costs, and benefits (Jamali, 2004). The
third-wave partnership initiative became very popular in less developed regions where
there were more untapped infrastructure needs (Lavanchy, 2018). Accordingly, many local
governments saw partnerships as a ‘mega credit card’ to alleviate local financial stringency
(Hodge & Greve, 2007) and committed to developing more projects through partnerships.
This is clear from the national PPP database. In hinterland provinces with lower GDP per
capita, hundreds of PPP projects were initiated regardless of local financial circumstances.
Moreover, local governments in these areas had few or no experiences with PPPs in terms
of how to minimize risks and build capacities (Lavanchy, 2018) and often awarded PPP
contracts to companies with name recognition, paying little attention to their economic
situation. For example, a public planning agency in Sichuan province signed a Sponge City
development project with OLE in July 2018, but by then OLE was already involved in a
cash crisis. As a result, this signed project remains unexecuted to date, as shown in the
database. Also, local governments still had a bureaucratic rather than a market mindset to
problem-solving, reducing the potential for PPPs to generate benefits. For instance, in
wastewater treatment and waste management sectors, the fee levels in long-term offtake
agreements are regulated by local governments rather than based on a market-based
formula (Lavanchy, 2018).
From the private side, despite the non-revenue-generating nature of most ecoenvironmental projects, the companies ambitiously expanded their PPP business, which
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generated substantial cash-flow risks. The six leading companies each contracted dozens
to hundreds of projects and took over the upfront costs to enable the projects to get started
quickly (Lei, 2018). For instance, OLE contracted 113 eco-environment projects with a
total investment reaching 169 billion CNY. As Table 3.4 shows, 97.6% of projects which
specified an upfront-cost split between partners had a 70-100% private upfront expenditure
of the total project investment. It is noteworthy that these projects’ aggregated upfront
expenditure was already more than 10 times OLE’s market value. The large number of
projects multiplied by each project’s high percentage of upfront cash investment can
accumulate huge debts and overwhelm a private company. Public listing helped secure part
of the cash flow, but the remaining had to be leveraged through market-based financing.
Table 3.4 Upfront-cost split between the public and private of OLE’s QPPP projects
Split of upfront expenditure

No. of projects

Private

Public

100.00%

0%

2

92.20%

7.80%

1

90.50%

9.50%

1

90.00%

10.00%

26

85.00%

15.00%

1

80.00%

20.00%

30

76.70%

23.30%

1

75.00%

25.0%

1

70.00%

30.00%

17

60.00%

40.00%

1

51.00%

49.00%

1
82

Percentage

97.6%

2.4%
100%

Source: Data from OLE’s annual reports (2014-2018)
These expansions soon generated cash crises for the companies that affected project
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progress and performance. The cash crisis was exemplified by the trendsetter OLE’s bondissue failure in May 2018, which caused stock-market panic for ‘eco-environmental PPPs’
(Lei, 2018). The stock price of many listed eco-environmental companies decreased by
over 50% in 2018. OLE suffered the largest loss - its total stock-market value shrunk by
60% in five months, approaching bankruptcy (Lei, 2018). Due to severe cash shortages,
OLE suspended or postponed some of its contracted projects under construction, such as
the Liuli Wetland in Beijing and the Zihe hydro-ecological project in Shandong province
(Li, 2018). Our interviews revealed that many companies shared these experiences. These
lengthy project delays led to inoperable and failed partnerships.
Assumption 2: Market support
Market support implies the availability of market-based tools to minimize the private
sector’s capital and revenue risks. Such tools include (1) policy tools to marketize nonrevenue-generating service value so that projects turn a profit, and (2) market-based
financing tools such as loans to secure capital for the private partner. However, such tools
are far from sufficient in the Chinese market. First, in eco-environmental services, only a
few types of services like theme parks or rehabilitated brownfields for real estate or
cultural-tourism sites can be revenue-generating, and the revenue rarely compensates for
the private investors’ huge upfront expenditure (Wang, 2018). Accordingly, the private
partner is put at remuneration risk and must depend upon the government for payback
(through general revenues, for example), which adds to the government’s long-term
burden. This is clear in the national database: among the 64 Sponge-City stormwater ‘PPP
projects’, only one project is user-payment, while 36 projects (56%) are governmentpayment and 27 are mixed payment (42%). In this sense, the partnership is simply an
instrument for the local government to develop projects while extending the payback
period from 3-5 years in the traditional built-transfer arrangement to 10-30 years in PPP
arrangements. Such projects were regarded as ‘fake PPP projects’ and have been prohibited
by the central government since 2018 (Lavanchy, 2018, p. 3).
Second, diversified market-based financial products help the private sector secure
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capital. Financing products such as credit-trading or banking and offset programs are rare
in China (Wang, 2018) and project financing is also not the norm (Lavanchy, 2018).
Moreover, the lending bias against private companies remained unchanged during this third
wave, even though the central government issued many policies attempting to create an
equitable environment for SOEs and private companies. Some large, state-owned banks
provided lower rates, some even as low as 1.2% for 10-20 years, which were only available
to 100% SOE-invested QPPP projects (Lavanchy, 2018). The private sector often had to
borrow from commercial banks or shadow banking systems at higher interest rates. At the
beginning of the third-wave initiative, some banks responded positively when the central
government encouraged ‘environmental PPPs’ (Tan & Zhao, 2019) and developed
financing products like carbon financing, pledged loans for forestry rights, and green ecoenvironment funds. However, the cash crisis increased the market’s concern about ecoenvironment projects’ return on investment and the bias grew to impact both the private
sector and the ‘environmental PPPs’. The interest rate for these projects increased from
roughly 6% in 2017 to 7.5% in 2018 (Li, 2018), and many of these projects became
financially untenable.
Assumption 3: Horizontal partnership structure
Although the eco-environmental partnerships became financially infeasible when
violating assumptions 1 and 2, the violations did not directly lead to a QPPP transition. A
PPP’s infeasibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the transition. It was not
until the third assumption was violated as the government prevented the partnerships from
failing or terminating, intervening by providing financial aid, which substantially
redirected the partnerships’ trajectory into a QPPP. PPPs imply a horizontal collaborative
structure between independent partners from the outset of a project (Brinkerhoff &
Brinkerhoff, 2011). Initially, a horizontal structure was present for the Chinese ecoenvironmental PPPs, given the listed companies’ nationally-recognized branding and
competency. However, when the cash crisis happened and the state intervened, the private
company’s autonomy degraded, and some private companies’ ownership changed.
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To help the private sector tackle the cash crisis, SOEs, and other state-owned assets
invested in the private sector by buying stock shares from the private listed companies.
During 2018-2019, 11 out of 21 companies had acquired state financial investment (Table
3.3). These formerly private companies became SOE-private joint enterprises, which
changed the power and responsibility structure of the partnership. The eco-environment
partnerships then evolved into QPPPs. While the cash shortfall was temporarily bridged,
high-rank manager interviewees worried about the companies’ independence. Some of
their specific concerns included the necessity to establish an in-house Communist Party
branch, or caps on the chief executives’ income — generally undesirable changes in the
private sector. More importantly, interviewees worried that state investment might force
them to follow the SOEs’ semi-bureaucratic-management system, which provides less
flexibility to adapt to the market.
Increased state involvement not only transitioned these PPPs into QPPPs, but also led
to ownership concerns and ‘nationalization’. For six out of the 11 companies with a state
bailout, an SOE became the largest stakeholder and the ultimate controller (Table 3.3). One
interviewee from the Palm put it simply: the future of the Chinese PPP market belongs to
the SOEs. In essence, private companies best situated to engage in ‘eco-environmental
PPPs’ were nationalized. While seeking support from the state, the private sector refrained
from participating in partnerships since the costs of loss of company ownership outweighed
the benefits of expanding into partnerships. In the 2018 annual reports, all companies
highlighted their concern about PPP risks. Those companies with the most partnership
contracts announced their strategic adjustment of shifting engagement from PPP to EPC
(Engineering Procurement Construction), and in the future would only accept PPP projects
with established payback mechanisms. YuanCheng stated it would limit PPP revenue to no
more than 1/3 of the company’s total revenue. Indeed, an interviewee from Tianyu
emphasized its lower debt ratio of 53.93% due to fewer ‘PPP projects’ contracted, and he
admitted to avoiding even the use of the term ‘PPP’.
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3.6 Discussion and conclusions
PPPs originated and became popular in liberal market economies (Linder, 1999).
However, their features and performance can be substantially transformed by the socioeconomic context (Table 3.5). In China, the central government attempted to achieve the
benefits of genuine PPPs, and both the local government and the private sector responded
actively by strengthening their qualifications to engage in PPPs. However, the initial PPPs
ultimately transitioned to QPPPs when the private partners’ lack of experience and access
to market support drove the PPPs to become SOE-private consortiums with a dominant
public sector partner, and the desired PPP benefits failed to materialize.
Table 3.5 Features of typical PPP versus Chinese QPPP
PPP

Socioeconomic
system

QPPP

Neoliberal market economy

Socialist market economy

Market tools to evaluate service

Insufficient tools to evaluate service

Financing products to secure capital

Lending bias towards SOEs
Government

Partner/Partner Government and private

and

SOEs/private

enterprises

equality
Yes
Economic
returns
Potential
concern

The private is a subordinate actor

Vary across projects: optimum or not

Privatization

(1) Suboptimum. (2) Impose hidden
debts on the governments.
Nationalization

Source: by authors.
In a non-liberal economy, partners’ inexperience with PPPs likely leads to PPP’s
infeasibility. China is more accustomed to in-house project development than PPPs (Mu et
al., 2011), and both the public and private actors viewed PPPs as a panacea and had lofty
expectations that were unlikely to materialize in the short run. For local governments, the
exorbitant easy revenues from the land market became unavailable after reforms in real82

estate regulations. Accordingly, they saw PPPs as an alternative to funding shortages and
showed more interest in increasing investments than improving governance (Cheng et al.,
2016). For the private sector, the economic slump in the landscape industry encouraged
private companies to hastily expand into eco-environment PPPs. Neither party had a sound
understanding of PPPs or their risks. Furthermore, previous partnerships had been
developed at a small-scale and were based largely on government-SOE partnerships. The
limited experience gained in these earlier projects was insufficient to ensure the successful
involvement of the private sector. PPPs entail skillful government involvement, including
encouraging the private sector to introduce business-like practices into the public sector.
However, local governments still employ bureaucratic power to intervene in the market to
achieve preferred outcomes, which counteract these business practices and reduce the
efficiency of service provision. More critically, partners should have complementary skills
to accomplish a shared goal (Jamali, 2004), which was not evident in the eco-environment
PPPs.
Although financial difficulties in PPPs are not rare, the inability of the private partner
to equitably access market support may be unique to the Chinese context. The environment
sector became the third-largest category of service in PPP initiatives, but the market was
far from ready to engage with this sector. In the previous two waves of partnerships, the
services provided were public utilities or transport services with stable, guaranteed revenue
streams. For non-revenue-generating PPPs in the third wave, when beneficiaries of
environmental projects were not paying for these goods and services directly, market-based
policy tools were needed to reduce profit uncertainties by placing a value on environmental
services. The absence of such instruments not only increased the private sector’s revenue
risk but also kept risk-averse financial institutions from incentivizing eco-environment
PPPs. The slow development of an enabling financial environment was critiqued by private
partners given the expanding environment-service partnerships (Li, 2018). Thus, PPP as a
new ideology in China requires a free and fair market environment, which implies not only
the availability of service-marketization tools but also a reduction of pro-SOE biases
(Zhang et al., 2015). If the macro socioeconomic system remains unchanged, the
disadvantages will cause PPPs to fail, facilitating their transition to QPPPs with an SOE
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partner, and scare off potential private partners.
In a public-dominant context, the powerful government partner did not let PPPs directly
fail, but tried to rescue them by forming a type of SOE-private consortium, which
transitioned PPPs into QPPPs. In neo-liberal economies, PPPs imply a horizontal structure
with some degree of partner equality as opposed to the domination of one partner over the
other (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Hence, when a PPP fails, the government may
take some remedial measures like the renegotiation of the contract or bailout (Vecchi et al.,
2017). In a Chinese context, the government acted as a ‘superpartner’ by directly
intervening in the market to rescue the private sector. The government’s strong intervention
turned the horizontal partnerships into hierarchical ones, undermining the private partner’s
independence. Only when the private sector becomes a competitive partner, the
government can reduce its involvement and treat commercial failures as risks borne by
business entities, as intended by the PPP arrangement (Hodge & Greve, 2007). Otherwise,
a poorly-performing private partner could conceivably under-perform a public sector
counterpart. Wei and Wang (1997) suggested that once the private sector reaches a certain
scale, the costs of maintaining a large and inefficient state sector will outweigh the benefits.
If this occurs, we predict that QPPPs will become less popular than traditional PPPs.
When PPPs revert to QPPPs, the widely-touted PPP benefits do not materialize. Rather,
two unexpected outcomes occur: hidden debts for the government and nationalization of
the private sector. When the cash crisis happened, the government became the payer of last
resort. Although private companies originally invested in eco-environment PPPs, once
PPPs became inoperable, their debts were taken over by SOEs. Cui (2019) found that SOE
investments in the private sector are not limited to eco-environment companies, but have
become a prevailing trend in all environmental service QPPPs. This echoes the general
experience of Chinese QPPPs in many sectors. Tan and Zhao (2019) suggested that among
the 572 national demonstration PPP projects, more than two-thirds are partnered with SOEs
(and thus are probably QPPPs). Of the top ten PPP investors, eight remain SOEs
(Lavanchy, 2018). When SOEs become the main investor, the government is then
ultimately responsible for payment on both sides of the partnership, which drives public
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budget deficits and subsidy overruns. QPPP thus creates a new form of hidden debt in
which ‘the government’s financial responsibility could easily be underestimated,
threatening the financial sustainability of the government’ (Tan & Zhao, 2019, p. 4).
In China, the private sector’s engagement in eco-environment QPPPs becomes
nationalized through state intervention, contrary to concerns of privatization resulting from
PPPs. This nationalization has driven the private industry’s waning interest in new PPPs.
It took only five years for the private sector to turn from enthusiastically embracing PPP to
cautiously shifting towards EPC schemes. When an enabling institutional environment
remained absent (Zhang et al., 2015), PPPs proved a poor fit for non-revenue-generating
sectors like eco-environment. For PPPs to extend into non-traditional areas with equally
complicated valuation like education, health, or social care, it is inevitable that many
smaller private enterprises will get involved. This points to the need for a more supportive
institutional environment to foster the private sector’s competence and independence.
To conclude, China’s third-wave partnerships, though sought to be ‘real PPPs’,
became inoperable when partners were inexperienced and the market was less supportive;
with state intervention, the private companies became subordinated partners in SOEprivate consortiums. PPPs thus transitioned to QPPPs with high degrees of public control.
Instead of sharing the government’s financial debts, QPPPs have become saddled with
tremendous hidden debt, which revolves back to local governments. As this research is
limited to the eco-environment service, we recommend a more comprehensive analysis of
QPPPs in other service sectors as well as in other countries. Of special interest is how the
new private-SOEs consortium influences QPPP projects, including potentially reducing the
lending bias and financing cost compared with the solely private partner.
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Appendix
Descriptions about the evaluation of the three assumptions
Assumption 1. Partners’ competence
•

Understanding/expectation of PPP:
-The purpose of PPP adoption

•

Experience with PPP
- Have partners ever engaged in PPP before?
- How do the partners respond to the central QPPP initiative?

•

Risk perception and aversion
-Understanding of partner’s financial affordability
-The payback mechanism of QPPP projects

Assumption 2. Market support
•

Market-based policy tools to monetize eco-service
-How is the project investment paid back? Sewerage fee, park entrance fee?

•

Financial products in the market
-What kind of financial products are available?
-How high is the interest rate?
-Do private companies have equal access to these financial products as SOEs?

Assumption 3. A horizontal structure
•

Independence of private companies
-Can the private shareholders make the decisions by themselves?
-Do the private shareholders have the veto power?
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•

Buyout/bailout
-State/SOE’s investments in the private company
-Is the investment a one-time bailout or a long-term plan?

•

Ownership
-Who is the largest/controlling shareholder?
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How does policy goal ambiguity influence policy
outcomes? Sponge-City Program implementation in old
neighborhoods
Hongmei Lu
Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA

Abstract
When a central program is implemented in a top-down manner, the possibility for
layered policy goals increases. A lack of coherence among these goals can cause policy
goal ambiguity. This research examines how policy goal ambiguity influences policy
implementation outcomes, exemplified by the Chinese Sponge City Program (SCP)
implementation. SCP is a centrally initiated program, which requires using largely green
instead of gray infrastructure to manage stormwater and implies two goals of sustainability
and stormwater management. The municipal government of Zhenjiang (a Sponge City pilot
program) layered a local goal of resident satisfaction. The sustainability goal has no clear
measurement indicators, but the other two have. Drawing on data from in-depth interviews
and field observations, this research finds that when the incoherent goals are not specified
a priority, implementers prioritize the stormwater management and resident satisfaction
goal, which put the sustainability goal in an inferior position. When the sustainability goal
has only vague descriptions, implementers downsize green infrastructure, yet still regard
the program as sustainable. This research concludes that in a multiple-policy-goal program,
the goal priority ambiguity leaves implementers the discretion to decide the order of goals
to manage interest conflicts; the goal measurement ambiguity allows implementers to
decide the degree of their commitment to and interpret the performance of a goal. Such
ambiguity-caused discretions may drastically divert some specific policy goals.
Keywords: multiple policy goals; goal incoherence; priority ambiguity; measurement
ambiguity; Sponge City Program
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4.1 Introduction
When a policy is implemented top-down, from the supranational to the national level,
or from the central to the local level, there could be multiple goals layered. Policy goal
layering involves grafting new policy goals onto an otherwise stable institutional
framework (Thelen, 2009), and may cause policy goal incoherence. Policy incoherence
implies conflicts between the multiple goals or objectives (Wellstead & Howlett, 2017),
and can result in policy goal ambiguity. Chun and Rainey (2005) have conceptualized
policy goal ambiguity in four aspects: goal mission comprehension ambiguity, directive
ambiguity, priority ambiguity, and evaluation ambiguity. Goal priority ambiguity, or the
level of interpretive leeway in deciding on priorities among multiple goals, will arise if the
hierarchical order is not specified by policy actors (Chun & Rainey, 2005). Goal evaluation
ambiguity refers to the level of interpretive leeway that a policy or program allows in
measuring the progress toward the achievement of the goal.
Urban stormwater management has become a severe environmental problem with rapid
urbanization and climate change (Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, & Runhaar, 2016). Urban
stormwater management will need to shift from traditional gray infrastructure to a green
infrastructure (GI) approach because of the substantial economic, environmental, and
ecological benefits that GI provides (Johns, 2019). SCP is such a program initiated by the
Chinese central government in 2014, advocating to manage urban stormwater through GI
approaches and to reduce the dependence on traditional large-scale gray infrastructure
systems (Ma, Wang, & Ding, 2018). SCP includes two goals. One is sustainability, which
implies the use of low impact and green strategies to manage stormwater. The other is
successful stormwater management, in terms of flooding and pollution control. SCP is
assumed to greatly benefit residents when implemented in urban and old town centers
where both green space and flood mitigation are desperately needed (H. Li, Ding, Ren, Li,
& Wang, 2017). When SCP was implemented in the pilot city of Zhenjiang, a local goal of
resident satisfaction was layered onto the central goal of sustainable stormwater
management by the local government tasked with implementing SCP. The frontline
implementers were supposed to attain all these goals while meeting all the performance
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requirements. This research will specifically focus on goal priority ambiguity and
evaluation ambiguity and determine how they influence the policy implementation
outcome, exemplified by the Chinese Sponge City Program (SCP) implementation in the
pilot city of Zhenjiang.
According to the national SCP Guide, 80% of a city’s built-up area should meet the
sponge criteria by 2030 (MHURD, 2014). As an indispensable part of the built-up area, old
residential neighborhoods usually suffer most from flooding damages (G. Li, 2017).
Zhenjiang’s old-neighborhood-based implementation will provide empirical evidence for
sustainable stormwater management when SCP is implemented in compact cities. The next
two sections are the literature review on policy goal ambiguity, and a brief description of
the city and methods, followed by the results of how in a multi-goal program, the
sustainability goal is undermined and the performance becomes hard to measure. The next
section presents the mechanism of such impacts. This paper ends with a brief conclusion
and suggestions for a myriad of other cities that are struggling in a stormwater management
paradigm shift.

4.2 Policy goal priority ambiguity and measurement ambiguity
Policy ambiguity can be found in many aspects, such as the definition of policy goals,
actor roles, or funding approach. Policy goal ambiguity is defined as a goal or set of goals
that allows leeway for interpretation (Chun & Rainey, 2005). Such ambiguity can be caused
by missing or inadequate information, inconsistency, and incoherence (Wellstead &
Howlett, 2017). Goals are regarded as coherent when they are logically related to the same
overall policy aims and can be achieved simultaneously without any significant trade-offs
(Kern & Howlett, 2009). They are incoherent if they are contradictory and if goals can only
be partially attained. Policy goal incoherence brings about the goal ambiguity concern,
which is regarded as having many serious consequences (Chun & Rainey, 2005). For
frontline implementers, they always have to coordinate among competing forces and
achieve these goals as much as possible. Meanwhile, they must make decisions about
which goal should take precedence over others at a given time.
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Goal priority ambiguity has been given less research attention (Conner et al., 2016).
Priority ambiguity refers to the degree of uncertainty in indicating priorities among
multiple goals. Priority ambiguity means it is not clear which goals should take precedence
over others during a specific period or there is no determined goal hierarchy (Chun &
Rainey, 2005). The goal with higher priority on the implementation agenda will more likely
be pursued; a higher priority goal need not conflict with a lower priority goal (Conner et
al., 2016). Goal priority can help moderate goal conflicts or goal incoherence with regard
to coordinating the intention-decision relationship (Conner et al., 2016). For instance, Gao
(2009) finds that in a hierarchical policy implementation system, usually the central
government will present and prioritize their policy objectives, which are used to direct local
policy implementation. This approach can ensure that the policy goals set at the central
level are achieved at the local level. Competing interests may influence goal priority
ambiguity, as politicians need to at least partly address the demands of all stakeholders in
order to encourage every affected party (Chun & Rainey, 2005). However, the juxtaposed
goals without any hierarchical arrangement and prioritization leaves much room for
interpretation for which goals should take precedence. Jung (2014) finds that priority
ambiguity actually decreases the public servant’s job satisfaction when many equally
important tasks have to be completed, which decreases their work efficiency. Chun and
Rainey (2005) found that the need for political compromise, age of the agency, or the
financial publicness are positively related to the agency’s goal priority ambiguity.
Compared with goal priority ambiguity, the goal’s evaluation ambiguity has caught
more attention in the goal-ambiguity literature. Evaluative goal ambiguity refers to the
level of interpretive leeway in evaluating the progress toward goal achievement (Chun &
Rainey, 2005). Policy goal clarity and clear performance measurements provide good
guidance for goal achievement. That means the policy goal needs to be translated into
performance indicators or indexes, in order to evaluate the policy outcome (Conner et al.,
2016). Different policies can have different degrees of clarity regarding evaluation criteria
or objective performance indicators. Instrumental criteria or indicators are not always
available in government public goods/service provision or policy implementation (Chun &
Rainey, 2005). Some policies have clear performance targets objectively and validly that
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allow very little space for interpretive leeway. Though Gao (2009) suggests that when the
public service performance is measured simply by numbers, some substantial aspects such
as governance improvement or social and political tensions can be neglected. Other policies
descriptively present performance measurements and give much space for interpretation in
evaluating whether the performance measurements are satisfied. Furthermore, Liu, Tang,
Zhan, and Lo (2018) suggest that policy measurement ambiguity in the form of confusing
goal standards is one of the main sources of divergence between central policy goals and
local interpretations. Researchers have argued that given the difficulty in articulating and
measuring goals, public servants have attempted to measure performance by looking at
surrogates such as inputs, processes, workloads, and outputs, rather than objective
outcomes and impacts (Chun & Rainey, 2005).
Policy goal ambiguity is usually studied as a concept or a phenomenon from
perspectives such as justifying the goal ambiguity, identifying the source and consequences
of goal ambiguity (Thelen, 2009; Wellstead & Howlett, 2017), or how to conceptualize
goal ambiguity (Chun & Rainey, 2005). This paper contributes to the literature by unveiling
how goal ambiguity influences the policy implementation outcome.

4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 SCP in the pilot city of Zhenjiang
Zhenjiang is one of 16 cities in the first pilot group to experiment with SCP. Each pilot
city was allocated a minimum of 1,200-million-CNY as seed money and was given two
directives: to raise matching funds through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and to
combine SCP with old neighborhood retrofit efforts. Zhenjiang’s SCP covers a total pilot
zone of 22.5 km2 with 80% of the zone located in the old downtown district that contains
both old residential areas and non-residential areas. Zhenjiang is the only pilot city that
developed SCP projects mainly in old downtown areas with substantial public engagement.
This research focuses on SCP implementation in old neighborhoods in which about
276,000 residents live.
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High-level goals are always expressed in the form of a mission statement and must be
translated into directives and guidelines for practical actions, especially for frontline
implementers (Chun & Rainey, 2005). SCP envisions a city to operate like a sponge to
absorb, store, and infiltrate through GI measures (H. Li et al., 2017). SCP is a green policy
patterned after the American Low Impact Development (LID) approach, as suggested by
the title of the national Technological Guide of Sponge City Construction: Establishing
LID Rainwater System (Trial) (MHURD, 2014) (“Guide”). LID, a term sometimes used
interchangeably with GI, refers to managing stormwater at the source with decentralized
small-scale green measures like rain gardens, green roofs, and permeable pavements, to
increase site infiltration and reduce dependence on engineering structures and decrease
infrastructure construction costs. While SCP’s overarching goal is sustainable stormwater
management, it is divided into two goals. The first goal is “sustainability”, which implies
to use low impact and green strategies for SCP, and therefore more green infrastructure
than gray infrastructure is used. However, no explicit performance measurements are
specified for this goal. In the 2018 Evaluation Criteria of the Sponge City national report,
the measurements concerning sustainability are vague and descriptive, with no specific
quantifiable indexes. The second goal is stormwater management, which has clear
technical indexes of 70% runoff control and 60% pollution control (Table 4.1). Moreover,
Zhenjiang specifically added a 30-year recurrence flood-control standard to this
stormwater management goal.
Green stormwater management programs usually need to address the flooding problem
and also other problems like social well-being, local economy, and ecosystem health
(Uittenbroek et al., 2016). SCP is a nationwide high-profile program, and therefore
Zhenjiang as a pilot city is under the spotlight. When SCP’s target population involves
hundreds of thousands of residents in old neighborhoods, there are perceivable challenges
for SCP’s implementation. The old neighborhoods, like those in most cities in China, have
various problems including outdated infrastructures, budget shortfalls, and poor
management associated with residents’ informal land use. Thus, the city proposed an
informal local goal of “resident’s satisfaction” (BHURD, 2018). Labeling it as “informal”
indicates that it was not directly integrated into Zhenjiang’s SCP goal statement, but the
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goal frequently appeared in meetings and media coverage and actually became an implicit
guideline in SCP implementation. To successfully complete this program, the city also
established a three-tier decision-making and implementation network including an ad hoc
SCP Office (Appendix Table 4.4). Many SCP public education activities through
municipal TV/ newspaper publicity, posters, and flyers were carried out around the city. A
WeChat SCP knowledge platform was developed, too. The Office partnered with each
neighborhood’s Commission to interact with and respond to residents, including answering
the 12345-complaint hotline. The number of complaint calls is a practical index to evaluate
whether SCP’s performance is satisfactory to residents.
Table 4.1 Layered policy goals in Zhenjiang’s SCP implementation
Program
Nation-

Goals

SCP
Sustainable stormwater management

level
Evaluation

Green 70% of runoff control
infrastructure 60% of pollution control

Program
Goals

SCP + neighborhood retrofit
Sustainable stormwater management

Resident’s
satisfaction

Citylevel

Green
Evaluation infrastructure

75% of runoff control

Number of
complaint

60% of pollution control

calls

30-year recurrence-interval flood control
Source: author’s compilation based on government documents.
4.3.2 Data collection
Data collection centered on five aspects: SCP’s goal coherence, goal priority, goal
measurement, challenges in policy implementation, and implementation outcomes. Data,
including the goal measurements (for sustainability, stormwater management, and
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resident’s satisfaction) and policy outcome (acceptance by residents, infrastructure projects
pass central government inspection) were first acquired through second-hand sources
including official documents and mainstream media coverage. However, most of these
official or mainstream-media sources largely describe the general results of SCP
implementation, such as how the SCP has mitigated the city’s waterlogging risk and how
citizens are satisfied with the program implementation. Therefore, an in-depth interactive
interview approach was used to gain detailed information, including insider knowledge
(Uittenbroek et al., 2016) and internal documents.
The lead author took a field trip to Zhenjiang in Aug. 2019, four months after the SCP’s
central inspection and acceptance, and visited twelve SCP project sites including nine
residential neighborhoods and three non-residential demonstration projects. Through
snowball sampling, interviews were conducted with eighteen officials (mainly officers
from the SCP Office and some GI officers outside the SCP Office) and professionals,
including SCP experts both inside and outside of Zhenjiang (Appendix 2). Some reinterviews were conducted by telephone during Feb.-Mar. 2020. Interview questions
inquired about: conflicts between goals (goal coherence); indications about which goal
should be prioritized (goal priority); the main challenges of developing SCP in old
neighborhoods (implementation process); and the outcomes (what are central
inspectorate’s comments about Zhenjiang’s SCP; residents’ response to SCP). In the field
trips to nine old residential neighborhoods, over twenty neighborhood residents and three
maintenance staff were interviewed. Questions included their perception of SCP, the
influence of the SCP on their life, their satisfaction with SCP implementation, and their
communication and interaction with the SCP implementers. All interviews were recorded
and transcribed.

4.4 Results
Sustainable city development for both human and other eco-environment functions is
challenging (Johns, 2019). Zhenjiang’s SCP was combined with old neighborhood retrofit
efforts. Thus, the implementation became very complicated, as implementers needed not
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only to handle the flooding problems but also the non-flooding problems. In the “SCP +
retrofit” program, the three goals of sustainability, stormwater management, and resident’s
satisfaction were found not always coherent. For instance, sustainability implies installing
many GI projects in neighborhoods, which requires more land and competes with residents’
demands for more parking lots. The resident’s flood-free expectation will require more
gray infrastructure in old neighborhoods and contradicts the sustainability goal. The
neighborhood retrofit improved resident’s satisfaction yet entailed resources channeled
from SCP, which undermined the sustainability goal, too. The three juxtaposed goals also
have a priority ambiguity, namely, there is no explicit statement about which one should
take precedence over others. As to goal measurement, both the stormwater management
and resident’s satisfaction can be measured, but not the SCP’s sustainability goal.
Implementers tried to attain these goals by following the available performance
measurements.
4.4.1 The goal of stormwater management
In a multi-goal program, when no goal priority is specified, to act according to the clear
numeric indexes is a safe and easy way for implementers to complete tasks. The city-level
stormwater management goal has three measurement indicators. The first two of 75%
runoff control and 60% pollution control were consistent with the central SCP guideline
and straightforward. Many high-density neighborhoods in Zhenjiang were built in the
1980s with water and sewerage infrastructure that quickly became outdated and undersized
and often failed to cope with the intensity of precipitation events made worse by climate
change (She, 2019). The SCP Office, made up of mainly water experts, collaborated with
both domestic and foreign experts, and developed many hydraulic models to meet the three
parameters. Some local experts had initially suggested to prioritize green over gray
infrastructure, but their recommendations were not adopted (Jiang, 2017). One SCP
planner argued: “We have thought about prioritizing green over gray in residential
neighborhoods, but there the sewer infrastructure per capita remains low. To give up gray
and depend on the green to achieve urban stormwater management is not realistic. So, we
juxtapose green and gray.” Accordingly, a series of large-scale water engineering projects,
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including sewage treatment plants, rainwater pumping station construction, and waterquality monitoring stations were developed. GIs including rain gardens or bioswales were
also used, however, compared with gray projects, the green ones were rather small-scale.
What is controversial is the third stormwater management measurement indicator of a
30-year flood-control standard, which is intended more to meet the resident’s satisfaction.
SCP was initiated in direct response to the focal event of the devastating Beijing 61-yearrecurrence flood in 2012 (H. Li et al., 2017). Thus, an implicit objective of SCP as expected
by both the public and media is to handle the extreme flooding. People will not easily
accept that SCP is not able to solve the extreme precipitation events in typhoon seasons.
Such expectation puts implementers in a decision dilemma. As water professionals, they
know that GIs can mitigate only the first inch (20-30 mm/24 hours) of rainfall (Wise, 2008),
and the limited green spaces could barely satisfy flood-free expectations. As public
servants, they must handle the public’s complaints and expectations (Gao, 2009). Finally,
implementers chose to meet the local goal by increasing Zhenjiang’s flood-control standard
to 219 mm/24 hours (or a once-in-30 years event standard). One interviewee from the
Zhenjiang Planning & Design Institute explained: “This index is very contentious, as
usually SCP is supposed to handle light to moderate rain. We increased the recurrence
standard because we want to make sure the residents will not suffer from flooding in the
following 30 years.” Achieving this 30-year standard in old neighborhoods requires extra
high-volume underground gray infrastructure, which makes the program much grayer than
green in old neighborhoods.
To meet all the three stormwater indicators, gray infrastructures substantially surpassed
GIs in both the number of projects and the percentage of budgets. As shown in Table 4.2,
GIs accounted for about one-third of the total SCP investment with the three bolded items
the only GI categories budgeted in SCP.
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Table 4.2 SCP PPP construction projects in Zhenjiang
Estimated
No.

Projects

investment (2,585.00
million CNY)

1

Central subsidy for pilot SCP of Zhenjiang

1,200.00

(1) LID measures

731.52

(2) Ecological restoration and hydraulic engineering

283.48

-Ecological restoration of the rainbow river

26.00

-Dongwei area hydraulic engineering

30.00

-Zhenrunzhou wetland eco-system construction

115.00

-Smart Sponge system construction

30.00

-Zhenrunzhou headwater quality guarantee project

82.48

(3) Pipe and network project

42.00

(4) Standard-reaching project of waterlogging
2

PPP SPV investment

143.00
1,385.00

(1) Sewage treatment plant

230.00

(2) Rainwater pumping station construction

164.00

-Rainwater pumping station construction in Yangzi River,

75.00

Yuqiao village
-Rainwater pumping station construction at Three-ferry, South

86.00

to Yangze River
-Retrofit of Six-ferry pumping station
(3)

3.00

A standard-reaching project of drainage, runoff, non-point
pollution treatment

Total

991.00
2,585.00

Source: B. Zhang, Huang, Du, Du, and He (2018)
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4.4.2 The goal of resident satisfaction
Street-level officers are responsible not only for providing public services but to deal
with public complaints in their jurisdictions (Gao, 2009). For SCP implementers, when
resident’s satisfaction became a local goal, they tried to meet their needs as well as gain
their compliance.
4.4.2.1 Sources of resident’s dissatisfaction
Client dissatisfaction can be caused by interest conflict or insufficient knowledge about
the policy. For instance, Ryan, Fábos, and Allan (2006) find that when implementing
regional greenways on private lands, it requires coordination with private landowners, as
they worry about the loss of privacy, liability, illegal parking, or noise. For SCP, although
the stormwater management goal had been attained, unfortunately, this goal did not
necessarily align with all resident’s interests. For instance, some first-floor residents did
not see the immediate benefits of the new rain gardens and gradually turned them into
private kitchen gardens again. Others complained about the shrubs in the rain garden
affecting their window daylighting. Furthermore, initial support from residents for SCP
projects decayed over time as the noise and inconvenience of construction impacted their
lives or eliminated space for their outdoor exercise. Some extreme behaviors emerged,
including unrooting plants or using boiled water to kill some plants in the night.
Neighborhood’s perception of policy together with their learning capacity also decides
the degree of their satisfaction. SCP, aiming for green-gray transition, is new to most
residents (Dai, van Rijswick, Driessen, & Keessen, 2018). Keeley et al. (2013) find that
the community oftentimes has a weak understanding of the stormwater problem and much
of the public believes that rainwater is “clean” and is not a problem. Although many SCP
public education activities were carried out, they are usually literal or dogmatic, and not
necessarily understood by residents. Some residents paid far more attention to very
localized outcomes while ignoring SCP’s overall green goals. Old residents have a deep
sense of belonging to the neighborhoods in which they have lived for decades; any change
may result in their dissatisfaction (Gu, Li, Zhu, & Wang, 2019). The residents’ complaints
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included a new steel bench that was too hot to sit on in summer, messy-looking green
spaces, and the slow replacement of mailboxes. Some disliked the yellow color of the
flowers and admired other neighborhood’s cherry blossom’s red color, which is a symbol
of happiness in traditional Chinese culture. However, in the field investigation, none of the
residents discussed stormwater management through a green or a gray approach.
Implementers had to spend much time communicating with the residents to reduce
vandalism and increase compliance before the projects could resume.
4.4.2.2 Improving satisfaction through “SCP + retrofit”
Old neighborhoods have many non-flooding problems, such as roof leakage, low
building energy-efficiency, insufficient amenities, and poor property management (She,
2019). The maintenance budgets depend upon each household’s property management fee,
but the collection rate is very low in old neighborhoods, especially when on average 52.6%
of residents are retired and live on pensions (Gu et al., 2019). Given these realities, SCP is
a great opportunity to improve the residential environment. As shown in Table 4.2, the
expanded SCP included gas-line retrofits, building energy efficiency, as well as aesthetic
upgrades such as building stuccoing and corridor lighting. In the aggregate, only three out
of all the eight categories related to flooding mitigation.
“SCP + retrofit”, being a free service provided by the government, generated increasing
retrofit demands from residents. It is noteworthy that such an expanded program requires
more expenditure than simply SCP development. Though Zhenjiang used a PPP to raise
funding for SCP, the financial gap remained large. Accordingly, the Office had selected
the 45 most qualified old neighborhoods out of hundreds for SCP development, based on
six criteria, including suffering from flooding, and poor facilities and landscaping. Such a
selective strategy brought about the service distribution impartiality issue. Many nonselected neighborhoods noticed neighborhood betterment from SCP implementation and
approached the Office for retrofits too. “Some residents used all kinds of networking,
others visited the office of the Neighborhood Commission three times a day, to petition for
retrofits. We (the SCP Office) are under high pressure but try to meet resident’s needs.”
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Gradually, some unlisted neighborhoods were also added to the SCP. As a result, the SCP
expanded substantially in both project purview and number, which made “SCP + retrofit”
almost not a stormwater management program.
Table 4.3 “Sponge + Neighborhood Retrofit” plan of Zhenjiang’s SCP
• Increase recreational spaces
Improve livability

• Preserve big trees
• Landscape reclamation
• Route impervious surface into rain gardens and

Flood Mitigation

green spaces
• Change sidewalks to permeable pavement

Sponge+

Better Property

• Re-organize property management

Management

• Establish maintenance guidance

Retrofit Gas lines

• Switch from coal gas to natural gas

Upgrade Water-

• Repair leaking pipes and meters

Supply Infrastructure

• Replace eroded pipes

Increase Parking

• Increase parking spaces
• Install porous parking lots
• Utilize thermal insulation materials

Energy Conservation

• Install window shading
• Upgrade electrical system and lighting

Sewer Separation

• Disconnect illegal connections
• Separate sewer from storm drains

Note: Projects that can contribute to flood mitigation are bolded. Source: (She, 2019).
Most public policies aim to align client behavior for compliance with government aims
(Howlett, 2018). In this sense, the “SCP + retrofit” was successful by improving the
resident’s satisfaction rate. According to one officer, “During a three-year period, our
12345-hotline received over 1,000 complaint calls. While many complainers repeatedly
called, it is estimated that there are about several hundred complainers, which is not a bad
result.” According to a public post-implementation poll, citizen’s satisfaction rate reached
94.63% by August 2018 (Sima, 2018). In interviews, some residents proudly told the author
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that their property’s value increased by 5%-10% after SCP. Accordingly, more residents
became willing to pay the property-management fee (Zhai, 2017).
4.4.2.3 Concerns about diverting from the sustainability goal
SCP’s sustainability goal is obviously to use a green approach to manage stormwater
(H. Li et al., 2017). Nevertheless, “SCP + retrofit” gradually diverted from this primary
focus when resources were channeled towards non-flooding related projects. For one, gray
infrastructure projects accounted for about two-thirds of the total funding, with the
remaining one-third left to be shared among GIs and neighborhood retrofit projects.
Moreover, when a project involved both gray and green infrastructure, the gray projects
were usually prioritized in both construction schedules and budgets. According to one
interviewee, in the first-year audit, some expenditures on shingle roof retrofits were not
accepted as SCP expenditures because they used shingles that did nothing to mitigate
flooding. Although the final audit for Zhenjiang’s SCP has not yet occurred, the
interviewed officers expressed anxiety about how to explain these expenditures to central
auditors. For the other, the “Sponge + Retrofit” program required more inter-departmental
coordination, necessitating hundreds of meetings between the sectors including planning,
housing, electricity, energy, water, transportation, environment, in order to solve the
surfaced problems. One frontline implementer commented that “So many tasks are
packaged into an ‘SCP + retrofit’ program. We have to solve problems from roof leakage
to septic overflow. Much of the work is not within the purview of SCP at all.”
4.4.3 The goal of sustainability without measurements
Although both the stormwater management goal and the resident satisfaction goal are
well attained, they say little about the sustainability goal. On the one hand, the conflicts
between green space and other land use that residents desire are always a big concern in
GI installation (Dhakal & Chevalier, 2016). In Zhenjiang, implementers removed some
unmaintained green spaces to mitigate these conflicts. In old neighborhoods, parking space
shortage is a severe problem. Accordingly, in neighborhoods where 80% of residents gave
consent, all available vacant corner spaces, as well as some unmaintained green spaces,
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were converted to pervious parking spaces. Increasing parking spaces was an effective way
to improve residents’ satisfaction, as it developed a new, stable revenue stream for
neighborhoods and improved the neighborhoods’ management. For example, in the old
SaoMaoGong neighborhood (35,000 m2), the retrofits added 8,000 m2 of pervious parking
space with some parking lots built on previous green spaces. The new parking lots were
leased out and the revenue was used to invest in neighborhood management, turning the
open neighborhood into a gated one. Residents were more satisfied with the tidy and safer
neighborhood, even though the green space diminished. In interviews, some residents
commented: “Previously the neighborhood green spaces were so poorly managed. In such
cases, we prefer not to keep these ugly spaces.” Replacing some green space with parking
lots became popular in other pilot projects, with some exceptions. ChaoYangMen, an old
neighborhood largely occupied by teachers, retired officers, and relatively higher-income
professionals, refused this approach and the green spaces were kept intact.
On the other hand, implementers also decided to give up some potential green measures
because they worried about GI’s long-term maintenance. For SCP, the central grants were
earmarked for SCP construction but not maintenance (H. Li et al., 2017), and old
neighborhoods do not have sufficient budget for maintenance. Without financial support
or neighborhood buy-in, this maintenance is not likely to occur. Given insufficient funding
for GI maintenance, implementers chose projects that would endure, instead of contributing
to SCP’s green stormwater-management goal. For example, for the roof leakage problem
in the retrofit program, implementers prioritized the shingled roof to solve the roof-leakage
problem for residents, as green roofs require more frequent maintenance. In interviews,
implementers expressed concerns about future maintenance: “We know the green roof is
better for SCP. But it still bears the risks of plant root penetration and roof leakage and
entails frequent maintenance. Moreover, we do not know who will take this responsibility
and where does the maintenance budget come from?” Thus, in SanMaoGong, 12,000 m2
flat roofs were retrofitted into shingled roofs, while only 700 m2 became green roofs.
Another low-maintenance example involves rain barrels. The original plan was to install
2,000 barrels, but ultimately only 500 were installed. According to one officer, they
doubted whether the residents would use the barrels (given that it was a new concept for
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them), and the maintenance would be regarded as future trouble, too. Although many of
such changes may seem small individually, in aggregate they may drastically reshape the
strategic policy intention (Lipsky, 2010).
To sum up, SCP in old neighborhoods, with substantial gray infrastructures installed,
met all stormwater-management objectives, and achieved a high resident-satisfaction rate,
but not necessarily in a sustainable or green approach. To hit the central goal, many GI
projects including parks, water bodies, and wetlands were added to non-residential areas
within and outside the pilot zone (Sima, 2018). These projects met the SCP goals of
mitigating flood risk through GIs, though these areas were far from the impervious surfaces
in the old residential districts.
Zhenjiang’s SCP passed the central inspection in 2019. As commented by one local
officer, “All the stormwater management indexes are met. Zhenjiang does have a lot of
green measures in SCP.” Another officer mentioned that “When there are no specific
indexes like the percentage of green roofs, the central inspectorate can only roughly
evaluate how ‘green’ the pilot program is.” According to two central inspectors, “SCP
remains a pilot program. When it is impossible to set clear indicators for the sustainability
goal, we try to encourage pilot cities to do better and adopt more green measures. But no
pilot city ‘fails to pass’ the final inspection”.

4.5 Discussion
The incoherence among multiple goals increased goal ambiguity, which is manifest in
both priority ambiguity and measurement ambiguity. Such ambiguities bring implementers
substantial challenges, but also leave them discretion to handle these challenges. At the
central level, the tenet of SCP was a paradigm shift from green to gray in stormwater
management (H. Li et al., 2017). However, the efforts towards the paradigm shift were
undermined in a multiple-goal implementation. As a result, while both the stormwater
management goal and the resident satisfaction goals were met, the sustainability goal was
substantially compromised. Goal priority ambiguity and goal measurement ambiguity,
when processed at implementers’ discretion, drastically altered the program
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implementation trajectory and outcome.
4.5.1 Goal priority ambiguity
Implementers tried to manage goal conflicts, they exercised discretion in deciding
whose interests or which goal took precedence when not all can be met simultaneously.
When they prioritized the resident satisfaction goal, the sustainability goal was put in an
inferior status and the program-implementation trajectory was altered. Environmental
programs usually involve both local interests as well as broader public interests (Lane &
McDonald, 2005). Regionally beneficial decisions may have adverse consequences locally,
and vice versa. The short term and parochial focus of community-based interests present a
risk of diverting policy outcome when policies involve much public influence (Leach,
Mearns, & Scoones, 1999). This is especially true in Zhenjiang’s old neighborhoods. Lowincome residents remain self-interest maximizers in enhancing pleasure and avoiding pain
(Howlett, 2018). Residents care more about small and short-term interests like the kitchen
garden or the window lighting but do not care much about whether the stormwater is
managed through green or gray measures. However, SCP’s goals of sustainable stormwater
management entail establishing as many green measures in neighborhoods as possible.
When multiple goals have severe interest conflicts, implementers resort to “satisfying”
solutions rather than optimal or desirable ones (Gilson, 2015). They must compromise
between program expectations and what they can feasibly achieve, predicting the impact
of client compliance on policy efficiency and effectiveness (Howlett, 2018). In SCP,
implementers prioritized residents’ needs in the hope of minimizing vandalism and
facilitating the implementation process. Resident satisfaction became an important action
guideline of frontline implementers. Accordingly, the flood recurrence standard was
increased to 30-years, which greatly exceeded the GI’s functioning capacity, and SCP was
combined with retrofit programs. Through this route, many non-listed neighborhoods were
incorporated into the retrofit lists, and some green spaces were turned into parking lots.
These discretions not only changed the trajectory of policy implementation, but also
the program’s resource redistribution, which is disadvantageous to the non-prioritized
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sustainability goal. Here the resources include both time and funding. Multiple goals make
it more difficult for implementers to concentrate efforts effectively (Jung, 2014). In
particular, an expanded “SCP + retrofit” program will require implementers to collaborate
with various stakeholders, including many relevant departments and residents. O'Toole Jr
and Montjoy (1984) warn that inter-organizational implementation tends to encounter more
delay and failure than would intra-organizational implementation. In the case of Zhenjiang,
the hundreds of meetings among a myriad of government departments had become very
time-consuming and daunting. The program implementation became slow and tedious. As
to the residents, given the knowledge gaps in public engagement (Leach et al., 1999),
implementers had to spend time on solving problems both relevant and non-relevant to
flooding, responding to resident’s demands both reasonable and unreasonable. SCP had a
three-year implementation period to complete hundreds of projects, leaving only a few
months to complete each project. Frontline implementers must balance between the
expectations of the program and what they are able to accomplish (Lipsky, 2010). While
struggling to catch up with the schedule, they paid less attention to the quality of each
project, including SCP’s green nature. For instance, they handled the problem of parkingspace shortage simply by removing some green spaces. The time constraint precluded
implementers from finding sustainable solutions, such as shared parking spaces with
nearby entities or vertical parking lots, which could solve the parking problem while
preserving the existing green spaces. In addition to the time resource, SCP’s funding was
also diverted from flooding mitigation. In an expanded “SCP + retrofit” program, only
three out of the eight task categories really related to stormwater management. To meet the
raised flood-recurrence standard, two-thirds of funds went to gray infrastructure, and the
remaining one-third had to be shared between GIs and neighborhood retrofit. The resource
deviations went so extreme that frontline implementers were risking their political
accountability, when neighborhood retrofits that had no flooding mitigation connection
were difficult to justify to central government financial auditors.
Implementers’ discretion in deciding the order of interests and goals can help
streamline the implementation process by boosting resident’s compliance. Yet such
discretion as well as the consequent resource reallocation drastically crowded out GI. The
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existence of multiple goals without a clear hierarchical order harms the salience and
relevance of efforts when interest conflict frequently arises (Jung, 2014). The priority
ambiguity is an important dimension of goal ambiguity that affects the sustainability goal
achievement. The program’s sustainability focus was largely diluted and diverted. Goltz,
Mayer, and Orr (2020) illustrate that without addressing local concerns, sustainable
development interventions are rarely sustained. In this research, when addressing too many
of residents’ concerns, the sustainable interventions are hardly sustained, either.
4.5.2 Goal evaluation ambiguity
While policy goal priority ambiguity leaves room for actors to decide which goal to
prioritize, goal evaluation ambiguity allows implementers the discretion to decide the
degree of their commitment to a goal and to interpret the goal performance in their own
way. For stormwater management, it has become a consensus that the paradigm needs to
shift from a traditional gray to a green approach, because of the substantial economic,
environmental, and ecological benefits that GI provides (Johns, 2019). Yet, for Zhenjiang’s
SCP, although it passed the central inspection and the residents were satisfied with the SCP
service, to what extent the paradigm has been shifted remains unclear, as neither the
stormwater indexes nor the resident satisfaction rate conveys any information about how
much and how well the GIs have been applied in SCPs. In this sense, these indicators are
far from sufficient to evaluate the sustainability goal of this program. Compared with the
straightforward stormwater indexes and the satisfaction rate, formulating measurable
sustainability criteria is more challenging (Hueskes, Verhoest, & Block, 2017). This is
consistent with GI’s measurement challenges. According to the interviews with two
drafters of the SCP Evaluation Criteria national report, the GI performance measurements
are descriptive instead of quantified because of the difficulty for central planners to develop
one-size-fits-all standards to adapt to local conditions. They admitted that the SCP’s
evaluation standard is far from perfect. While for city-level implementers, the benefits of
GIs are still perceived as difficult to gauge and associated with high maintenance costs
(Johns, 2019).
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Bastien (2009) finds that when there are no clear goal evaluation criteria, street-level
implementers will treat such absence as a green light. In other words, goal measurement
ambiguity leaves implementers much freedom in deciding to what degree they commit to
that goal. In SCP, when implementers prioritized the other two goals, the sustainability
goal was already put in a disadvantaged position. The goal was further downplayed when
it did not have a clear measurement. For SCP, GI’s maintenance is a perceivable burden.
Ryan et al. (2006) suggest that when the implementation agency does not have enough
resources to manage and maintain GIs on a long-term basis, they may count on private
entities or the public to share this burden. In cities like Cleveland and Milwaukee, the
management and maintenance burden precluded the sewer authority from using a GI
approach (Keeley et al., 2013). In Zhenjiang, when both GI’s maintenance responsibility
and budget were not clear, implementers chose to reduce some feasible GI measures,
including scaling down the rain barrel plan and using shingle roofs instead of green roofs.
Without clear measurement, implementers were actually granted substantial freedom to
decide how much GIs to be used in SCP. This points to the importance of establishing some
basic sustainability targets, which can prevent GIs from being crowded out, secure funding
for GIs, and encourage more GI installation (Johns, 2019).
Without clear goal evaluation criteria, frontline implementers may also believe that
their own evaluation criteria would match the organization’s criteria (Bastien, 2009). When
there were no specific indicators to evaluate the sustainability goal, all actors had their own
way to explain what sustainability means. For local implementers, Zhenjiang’s SCP
implementation had been successfully completed when the three indexes of stormwater
management were achieved, residents were satisfied with SCP, and the sustainability goal
was attained by the installation of various GIs, such as rain gardens, bioswales, rain barrels,
and green roofs in old neighborhoods. Nevertheless, most of these green measures were
established more in a demonstration way, rather than being extensively and intensively
used to solve the water problems. For central inspectors, without clear performance
indicators, they cannot precisely evaluate how green the pilot city’s SCP is. These may
explain why sustainability considerations currently play only a limited role in many urban
infrastructure projects (Hueskes et al., 2017).
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4.6 Conclusions
When a central policy is implemented top-down, the layered cross-level goals become
incoherent and cause policy goal ambiguity, which substantially deviates the policy process
and outcome. Neither the goal priority ambiguity nor the measurement ambiguity is
beneficial to the sustainability goal achievement in a complex implementation setting.
Policy goal priority ambiguity allows implementers the freedom to decide which goal to
prioritize when interest conflicts arise in the implementation process, which puts the
sustainability goal in an inferior position. Goal measurement ambiguity further allows
policy actors to decide how much they may commit to a goal and to interpret the service
performance in their own way. In SCP, when no specific indicators were available to
evaluate the sustainability goal, some small-scale GI demonstration projects symbolized
sustainability, which substantially undermined the green tenet of SCP.
As can be learned from this SCP case, clearly specified goal priority and measurement
may bolster the goal achievement, though clarity is not always possible (Chun & Rainey,
2005). In a top-down policy implementation system, the high-level decision-makers may
prioritize their policy objectives, which can ensure their preferred policy goals are achieved
at the local level (Gao, 2009). Although it is difficult for central decision-makers to
establish one-size-fits-all sustainability measurements, they can require local implementers
to develop some basic performance indicators based on local conditions, which can ensure
the implementer’s commitment and prevent misinterpretation.
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Appendix
Table 4.4 Main policy actors involved in Zhenjiang SCP implementation
Central government: Commissioned SCP to pilot cites, including Zhenjiang
City level

Role

Members
Director: Mayor
Deputy Director: Vice Mayor

Leading Group of
Zhenjiang SCP
(ad hoc)

Member: Representatives from different public
agencies, including planning, housing, electricity,
energy, water, transportation, environment, as well as
some relevant Districts.
Director: Vice Mayor

SCP headquarters
(ad hoc)

Leadership

Deputy Director: Director of the Municipal Bureau of
Housing and Urban & Rural Development (BHURD)
Deputy Secretary-General of the municipal
government
Office Chief: Director of BHURD

SCP Office (ad
hoc, established
in Municipal
Administrative
Division of
Water Supply
and Drainage)

Deputy Chief: Consultant of Bureau of Finance
Deputy director of the Bureau of Water
Resource
Deputy Director of BHURD
Implementation

Members from the Municipal Administrative Division
of Water Supply and Drainage

Technological
experts

Project
planning and
design

Professionals from Herrera Environmental Consultants
(US), CPG Corporation (Singapore), Shanghai Water
Planning& Design Institute, Zhenjiang Planning &
Design Institute, ManJiangChun Urban Planning &
Design Co. Ltd., and so on.

Public Private
Partnership SPV

Project
construction

China Everbright Water Co. Ltd. (Zhenjiang)

Coordination

Commission director and employees. (The commission
is at the lowest level in the Chinese administrative
system.)

Neighborhoodlevel
Office of
Neighborhood
Commissions
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Clients

Participation

Residents

Source: compiled by authors, part of data from Zhenjiang. gov.cn

Table 4.5 A list of interviewees
Affiliation of interviewees

Number. of
interviewees

1.

The Municipal Bureau of Housing and Urban & Rural

1

Development
2.

Zhenjiang Planning & Design Institute

2

3.

Municipal Administrative Office of Water Supply and Drainage

2

4.

Municipal Bureau of Transport

1

5.

Neighborhood Commission

3

6.

ManJiangChun Urban Planning & Design Co. Ltd.

1

7.

Zhenjiang EverBright Water Co. Ltd.

1

8.

Zhenjiang SCP expert

1

9.

Drafter of Sponge City Guide/Evaluation Criteria (National

2

Report)
10. SCP professional out of Zhenjiang

4
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5. Conclusions
“Sustainable city” is a broad topic. This dissertation investigates two aspects of green
space provision and stormwater management in cities. However, as is obvious, the relevant
policy-making and implementation are very complex. This may be partially because many
urban sustainability policies or programs resemble policy experiments. In this dissertation,
the first two policies are innovated at the local level, while the second two are central
policies tried out at the local level. The four chapters also represent different stages in a
typical public-policy process. Ch. 1 deals with a policy entrepreneur, which happens at the
initial agenda-setting stage. Ch. 2&3 discuss policy tools, which are used in the policy
design and implementation stage. Ch. 4 involves how the policy goal design influences
policy outcome, which links the policy formation stage with the policy evaluation stage.

5.1 Chapter review
Bottom-up innovations are based on local situations and show better chances to
succeed. Chapter 1 tells the story of how an individual’s efforts can be decisive in driving
a city’s green roof policy innovation. The policy entrepreneur is a proactive insider.
Vertical greening’s esoteric nature implies that initially it was overlooked by the local
government and was almost invisible to the media and the general public. The policy
entrepreneur put it on the policy agenda and looked ahead to implementation, trying to
remove barriers to adoption. All of her political, technical, and publicity efforts were
focused on facilitating the implementation of vertical greening. Her efforts in Shanghai set
an example for other cities in China, which have subsequently advanced this vertical
greening innovation.
The green roof regulation presented in Ch. 1 engages green roofs as non-profit public
goods. Ch. 2 points to the insufficiency of such public policies in response to the private
sector’s provision of shopping mall roof gardens, in the form of club goods. When the
public policies are designed only for public goods, they fail to internalize the club good’s
positive externalities and respond to their cross-sector nature. Without sufficient policy
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support, there are financial, legitimacy, and oversight gaps. For now, when the pioneering
one-third of malls have established roof gardens but are struggling with the sustainability
problem, and the other two-thirds of malls have not taken action yet, it is important to
provide a timely and sufficient institutional response.
Compared with a club-good approach, PPP is a more popular way of the private sector’s
engagement in public service provision. PPP’s application to non-revenue generating
environment services is an unprecedented yet bold initiative in a public-dominant political
system, especially when the institutional environment is not ready yet (S. Zhang, Gao, Feng,
& Sun, 2015). Although the central government is eager to include the private sector and
seeks to establish ‘real PPPs’, it becomes inoperable when partners are inexperienced and
the market is less supportive. PPPs thus transitioned to QPPPs with high degrees of public
control. Instead of sharing the government’s financial debts, QPPPs have become saddled
with tremendous hidden debt, which revolves back to local governments.
Finally, SCP as a policy experiment provided the pilot cities the opportunities to try out
sustainable stormwater management. However, in a cross-level implementation system,
goal ambiguity, especially the goal priority ambiguity and measurement ambiguity, largely
compromised the policy outcome, as priority ambiguity leaves implementers the discretion
to decide which goal to take precedence, while measurement ambiguity allows actors to
interpret the service performance in their own way. These discretions largely compromised
the sustainability goal.

5.2 Limitations with this research
This dissertation uses causal case study approaches. Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests that a
single case study can provide valid research outcomes when the case in question is
supposed to be sufficient and illustrative enough. The four cases in this research are
selected mainly because they are critical and unusual. For instance, in Chapters 1&2, both
the two Shanghai cases are picked because Shanghai is the pioneering city in green roof
development, with the green roofs provided either as public goods or club goods. Another
reason lies with the author is a long-term observant of the green roof practice and policy
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development in this city, which to some degree ensures data availability and validity. In
Chapters 3&4, the Zhenjiang case and the eco-environment service sector are selected also
because of their distinctiveness. In this sense, the overall replication logic is not the priority
of this research. According to Yin (2017), a case study must be distinguished from the
sampling logic commonly used in surveys for three reasons. First, a case study is not the
best method for and thus should not be used to assess the prevalence of phenomena.
Second, an individual case study would have to cover both the phenomenon of interest and
its context, yielding many potentially relevant variables. This would require an impossibly
large sample of cases—too large to allow more than a superficial examination of any given
case. Third, if a sampling logic had to be applied to all types of research, many important
topics could not be empirically investigated. For these reasons, the findings of this research
are better to be understood as the phenomena of interest rather than the phenomena of
prevalence.
However, other research methods like surveys and statistics could also be used for nextstep research. Using a survey, while abiding by certain principles such as ensuring
representativeness, minimizing bias, and improving response rate by following procedures
in handling the data, I will be able to enhance the external validity of the study. For
instance, when more cities start to mandate green roof policies on new buildings, I can
examine whether these followers are adopting the green roof policy because of policy
entrepreneurship or because of policy learning. Policy entrepreneurship is the main driver
of policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). However, when the pioneering city has
already developed and implemented policies successfully, other cities may simply
“borrow” such policies without strong pushes from a policy entrepreneur, which is of
course not always available. So I can use a survey to identify the drivers of green roof
policy change. In a similar vein, I can use a survey to understand why green roof adoption
remains low in the Sponge City program to find the influencing factors such as policy,
technology, and physical barriers (roof structure and load).
In this research, each chapter uses a case to explain a “why” or “how” research question
in policy theories. It implies that appropriate explanations clarify the causal process on
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which the outcome is drawn. In order to answer the research question, causal relationships
between events need to be identified. Causal case studies tell a story of a
sequence of events or processes and use these events or processes to build explanatory
theories that derive from this story (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). For future research, I can
conduct causal case studies more rigorously. Given the societal context, there could be the
case of unifinality, multifinality, or equifinality (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Lindquist &
Wellstead, 2018). It means that the same effect could be caused by various mechanisms or
vice versa. In this line of thinking, the mechanism provides an explanation about the
outcomes. Moreover, the role of the mechanism is not limited to explanation, it has also
the potential to distinguish true causal relations from spurious correlations. Obviously, the
causal mechanism approach would help identify important variables and detect the causal
relationship between the variables.

5.3 Future research
Policy innovation always depends upon a reformer’s commitments. A policy
entrepreneur is more likely to succeed at the local level or at a small scale where an
entrepreneur’s capacity is sufficient to influence all three policy streams towards successful
policy change (Cairney, 2018). ‘Trivial’ topics like vertical greening usually lack outside
catalysts as they do not attract much attention from interest groups, the public, or the media.
In this sense, entrepreneurship as a powerful internal driver contributes to the overall policy
change. It is worthwhile to look also at other sectors with various political and vested
interest stakeholders. It would be expected that other entrepreneurial strategies to earn
political capital are needed towards desirable policy change (He, 2018).
Collaborative governance towards public good provision, especially the non-profitgenerating green space, remains rare. Both the club-good approach and the PPP approach
to urban green space development deserve more research attention. This points to future
research potential to explore the enabling institutional environment. SMRG can be
regarded as a type of voluntary environmental program that provides positive externalities
to the city. But as shown from this study, given the less sustainable outcome as a result of
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voluntary innovation, it is worthwhile for the government to take proactive measures to
direct the voluntary program towards a more sustainable outcome. Future research can
focus on how the greening department acts as a policy entrepreneur to build allies with
other departments in creating a more conducive institutional environment. As to the other
market-based solution of QPPP, this research is limited to the eco-environment service
sector in China. Of special interest is a more wide-ranging study to examine how the new
private-SOEs consortium influences QPPP projects, including potentially reducing the
lending bias and financing cost compared with the solely private partner.
Finally, policy goal ambiguity is a well-studied theoretical topic. In this research, it
proves to be especially detrimental to the sustainability goal achievement when both the
goal priority and measurement are vague. It would be helpful to do some comparative
research, for instance, in a matrix of goal priority clarity/ambiguity and goal measurement
clarity/ambiguity to see how different combinations of ambiguity/clarity may influence the
policy outcome. Nevertheless, although goal clarity is important to the sustainability goal
achievement, other supporting policies are also critical. For instance, in the Sponge City
program, stronger incentives for green roofs could mobilize more private developers, as
shown in the SMRG case. For the moment, except for some metropolitan cities like
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing, most sponge pilot cities have not institutionalized green
roofs in their municipal laws. Once various regulations or incentive policies are in place,
green roofs will be generalized more easily.

5.4 Advice for policymakers
For policymakers, it would be beneficial to understand the positive and encouraging
outcomes from a policy entrepreneur’s efforts. That Shanghai became the first city in the
nation to mandate vertical greening can be largely attributed to the policy entrepreneur’s
initiative and perseverance. This may shed light on other cases or scenarios. For example,
as to the SMRG case, the greening department (as the advocacy agent) can act as a policy
entrepreneur and build allies with both the water and the planning departments, to shepherd
the necessary policies for incentivizing club goods such as shopping mall green space. In
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a similar vein, policy entrepreneurship may also propose stronger incentives for green
infrastructure in Sponge City programs.
In addition to the role of policy entrepreneurship, policymakers may also examine the
effectiveness of policy tool design. Existing policy tools are largely designed for the
scenarios of government direct provision of public goods. Nevertheless, when the private
sector is involved in public goods provision, the intrinsic sectoral interest conflicts will
entail policy tool redesign to take the private partner’s interests into consideration. Such
interests may include both a green reputation and monetary benefits. In this sense, the
government can encourage the enterprises to voluntarily fulfill their corporate social
responsibility by establishing green roofs. For large scale green infrastructure projects, the
government would need to design policy tools to ensure that benefits can cover the
production costs and to allow the private sector to be self-sustaining through motivating
the private sector to consistently contribute to public/club goods provision. Otherwise, the
initial voluntary engagement may degrade and become unsustainable as in both the SMRG
and eco-environmental PPP case.
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